




LECTURE ONE: THE ECONOMY OF VIRTUE
A. Founding Fathers and Rebel Children
I begin with a passage from Alexander Bickel's classic work, The Least
Dangerous Branch:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian.
force in our system. There are various ways of sliding over this ine-
luctable reality. Marshall did so when he spoke of enforcing, in be-
half of "the people," the limits that they had ordained for the insti-
tution of a limited government . . . . Marshall himself followed
Hamilton, who in the 78th Federalist denied that judicial review
[was undemocratic].
"It only supposes," Hamilton went on, "that the power of the
people is superior to both [the courts and the Congress]; and that
where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the
Judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former."
But the word "people" so used is an abstraction. Not necessarily a
meaningless or pernicious one by any means; always charged with
emotion, but nonrepresentational-an abstraction obscuring the real-
ity that when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legisla-
tive act, . . . it thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual
people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is
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what actually happens . . . and it is the reason the charge can be
made that judicial review is undemocratic.'
In starting with Alexander Bickel, I have been motivated by something
more than filial piety. Bickel's presentation of the "countermajoritarian
difficulty" both expresses and codifies the modern constitutional lawyer's
ironical relationship to the Constitution. By taking its title from the Fed-
eralist No. 78,2 The Least Dangerous Branch presents itself as a contri-
bution to a constitutional tradition extending backward in time to the
Founders themselves. But we are not halfway through Bickel's first chap-
ter before the passage I have read announces a very different theme: If we
are to make sense of our constitution, we must cut ourselves off from the
Framers' theory of democracy. The Least Dangerous Branch opens with a
second declaration of independence, not an effort at constitutional inter-
pretation. The beginning of constitutional wisdom, apparently, is that
Hamilton, Marshall, and the rest were utterly mystified by representative
government.
The irony of the title page is raised to a higher power by Bickel's posi-
tion among contemporary commentators. He is not typed as the radical
iconoclast. Instead, he is revered as spokesman-in-chief for a school of
thought that emphasizes the importance of judicial restraint. Time and
again, this school has taught lawyers to resist the temptation to reject
long-standing constitutional doctrine whenever they find it in conflict with
their personal political philosophies. Indeed, this aura of restraint has, in
large part, made Bickel's "countermajoritarian difficulty" what it has be-
come-the starting point for contemporary analysis of judicial review.
What to make, then, of the fact that Bickel's statement of the counterma-
joritarian difficulty advances the very argument that the partisans of con-
stitutional restraint have taught us to condemn-inviting us to disdain the
Framers' theory of democracy as "nonrepresentational"?
Whatever our ultimate answer to this question, one thing should be
clear: Bickel's act of patricide could never have succeeded if he had been
writing as an isolated scholar, removed from the main line of American
political and legal thought. The countermajoritarian difficulty proclaimed
in The Least Dangerous Branch achieved its ascendancy over the modern
legal mind by expressing an opinion that, after two full generations, had
become the prevailing wisdom in both scholarly reflection and legal prac-
tice. For judges and lawyers, the "countermajoritarian difficulty" recalled
1. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962).
2. "Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, .. the
judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of
the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them." THE FEDERAUST
No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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the Old Court's long, and ultimately futile, judicial struggle against the
New Deal. For them, Bickel's warning reinforced the impropriety of us-
ing the Constitution as laissez-faire capitalism's ultimate weapon against
popular control.
Similarly, The Least Dangerous Branch expressed the central legal
conclusion toward which the American academy had been struggling for
generations: that, somehow or other, we must transcend the Framers' vi-
sion if we are to make our Constitution fit the needs of a modern demo-
cratic society. Thus, academic political science, as we know it, begins in
the 1880's with Woodrow Wilson's great book Congressional Govern-
ment;3 academic constitutional law begins about the same time with the
publication of James Bradley Thayer's early effort to reconceptualize ju-
dicial review. 4 In these foundational texts of the modern American univer-
sity, the dangerous tendency of our governmental institutions to act un-
democratically is already established as a central source of scholarly
anxiety.
This concern gained further academic force with the rise of Charles
Beard's interpretation of the Founding.5 In Beard's familiar view, the
Framers' masquerade in the name of the "People" is nothing but a bad
joke. The historical truth is that the Constitution was a fundamentally
anti-popular act by which a tiny minority of bond-speculators and the like
successfully strangled our popular revolution. No wonder, then, the uir-
gent need for heroic reconceptualization of the Constitution in general, the
Supreme Court in particular. Since the document was not intended as a
democratic charter in the first place, are not constitutional lawyers abso-
lutely right to leap off The Least Dangerous Branch and see judicial re-
view for what it truly is-a deviant institution in any self-respecting de-
mocracy? On this view, the task for constitutional law is to define a role
for the Supreme Court that self-consciously recognizes its presumptively
countermajoritarian character, and yet reserves a legitimate sphere for the
continued exercise of judicial review.
3. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
4. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (1893).
5. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913). For characteristic Progressive era appraisals of The Federalist, see id. 158-88; C. MERRIAM,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 96-122 (1920); 1 V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CUR-
RENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 284-88 (1927). For an elaborate discussion of Beard's views of the
American Revolution in particular, and those of the Progressive historians in general, see R. HOF-
STADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 167-346 (1968). Since Hofstadter's book was written,
American historians have become increasingly skeptical of Beardian premises. For a thoughtful effort
at rehabilitation, see Diggins, Power and Authority in American History: The Case of Charles A.
Beard and His Critics, 86 Am. HIST. REV. 701 (1981). For an earlier critique of the Progressive
characterization of The Federalist, see B. WRIGHT, CONSENSUS AND CONTINUITY, 1776-1791, at
40-60 (1958).
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This, notoriously, has been no easy matter. Bickel's own scholarly life
is, once again, emblematic. Increasingly dissatisfied with his effort to ra-
tionalize judicial review in The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel's search
was cut short by premature death before he could find an answer with
which he might rest content. And in the decade since his death, we have
been inundated with new answers to Bickel's question. Hardly a year goes
by without some learned professor announcing that he has discovered the
final solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty, or, even more darkly,
that the countermajoritarian difficulty is insoluble.
This will not be the aim of the present Lectures. Rather than solving
the countermajoritarian difficulty, I mean to dis-solve it, by undermining
the vision of American democracy and American history that constitu-
tional lawyers had developed by the Progressive era. In contrast to the
image of the Founding inherited from the Progressive historians, this first
Lecture seeks to recover the distinctively democratic foundations of our
Federalist Constitution. The second Lecture argues that a neo-Federalist
theory of democracy permits a deeper understanding of the distinctive
problems of modern political life than does its Progressive competitor. It is
only then that I shall turn, in the last Lecture, to consider the role the
Supreme Court may legitimately play within a neo-Federalist constitu-
tional system.
B. Constitution and Revolution
Just as the Progressive interpretation of the Constitution was the prod-
uct of many statesmen and scholars, working in a complex series of re-
lated enterprises, so too the neo-Federalist vision can be enriched by the
past generation's practical experience, as well as its academic achieve-
ments in American history, political science, and political philosophy. I
shall, however, resist the temptation to make explicit use of these parallel
discoveries. Instead of playing historian or political scientist, philosopher,
or constitutional pundit, it will be enough if I can do justice to our sense
of legal craft. Even after two full generations of academic law, the legal
culture has not yet been purged of all texts that link constitutional lawyers
to the Federalist past. The most notable text, of course, is the Constitution
itself. But there is a second text that has not yet lost its hold on the legal
mind: The Federalist. It is true, of course, that we are all too accustomed
to using this text in the manner of The Least Dangerous Branch-citing
it for a catchphrase while dismissing the larger conception of constitu-
tional government that gives the slogan life. I believe, however, that a very
different reading is well within the collective capacities of a profession
whose business it is to breathe new life into old authorities.
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1. We the People?
Let us begin the effort at constitutional commentary from the very be-
ginning: "We the People of the United States." We will get nowhere until
we begin to appreciate the remarkable act of authority required to write
these words. An observer at the scene, after all, would only see a smallish
group of whiggish gentlemen huddled together in an unprepossessing
room in Philadelphia. Nor can there be any doubt that these gentlemen
were acting beyond their legal authority-especially in claiming the right
to ignore both the Articles of Confederation and the state legislatures, by
having their posturings on behalf of "the People" ratified by similar "con-
ventions" posturing in some, but not all, of the States.' What in the world
6. Two distinct elements of the Convention's problematic claim to legality should be distinguished:
The first involves its right to propose its' new Constitution; the second concerns its right to revise pre-
existing ratification procedures. On the first question, I do not wish to take a hard and fast line.
While the Confederation Congress did explicitly limit the Convention to "the sole and express pur-
pose of revising the Articles of Confederation," see 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 14 (M. Farrand ed. 1966), there are at least plausible legal arguments to support the
Convention's decision to scrap the Articles altogether. On the one hand, one may follow The Federal-
ist and argue that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, a deeper analysis reveals more funda-
mental continuities between the Constititution and the Articles. See THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at
249-55 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). On this line, the fact that Congress, in calling for a
Convention, had expressed the desire for a "firm national government" justified the Convention in
rejecting a narrow interpretation of the "sole and express purpose" limitation.
On the other hand, one may follow an argument most forcefully developed by Julius Goebel, who
seeks to justify the Convention's action by diminishing the legal role of the Confederation Congress in
authorizing the Convention. On this view, the decisive legal text is not the congressional call for a
Convention but the legal acts taken by each of the individual states when authorizing delegates to the
Convention. See J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 198-204 (1971). Even Goebel ad-
mits, however, that three states-among them the critical states of Massachusetts and New
York-expressly referred to Congress' limiting language in their own enabling acts; that a fourth
state, Delaware, was even more restrictive; and that a fifth state, Rhode Island, refused to send any
delegates at all to the Convention. Id. at 202. Given these concessions, I do not see why Goebel
believes, as he plainly does, that he has laid to rest doubts about the legality of the Convention's
decision to scrap the Articles and propose a new Constitution.
I myself agree with those scholars who are unpersuaded by the strictly legal arguments, advanced
by Publius and his later apologists, on behalf of the Framers' right to scrap the Articles and propose a
new Constitution. See, e.g., Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States Consti-
tution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979); Wright, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST at ii (B. Wright ed.
1961). Nothing in my larger project, however, depends on the assumption that the legal arguments on
behalf of the Convention would be rejected as clearly erroneous by any self-respecting court. For it is
precisely my point that no such court existed, and that, in scrapping the Articles, the Convention was
perfectly aware that it had taken a step that many thoughtful citizens would find illegal. See H.
STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR 7 (1981). Given this fact, the Federalists could
not suppose that their constitutional right to scrap the Articles could be adequately established merely
by citing legal authorities. This, as we shall see infra pp. 1021-22, is precisely Publius' view of the
matter. I shall define a "Convention," then, as an assembly whose right to propose a new constitu-
tional solution is open to substantial good-faith legal doubt.
The second legal aspect of the Convention's activities is a good deal less problematic. Given the
explicit requirement of unanimous consent by all thirteen state legislatures to be found in Article XIII
of the Articles of Confederation, the Convention's assertion that nine state "Conventions" could ade-
quately ratify on behalf of the People was plainly an extra-legal assertion of democratic authority.
This point is explicitly conceded in the Federalist Papers, see THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 254 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Even Goebel, the Convention's most notable modern legal apologist,
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justified the Framers in imagining that this charade gave them a better
claim to speak in the name of the People than the legally constituted gov-
ernments of the day?
It is the first great merit of The Federalist Papers that they do not
allow us to view this assertion of authority as if it were the result of a
counter-revolutionary coup d'6tat. Rather than confessing that the Phila-
delphia Convention suffered from an antidemocratic difficulty, Madison,
Hamilton, and Jay-presenting themselves under the evocative name
Publius-argue that their new constitution is best seen as the culmination
of their generation's revolutionary experience in popular government.
It is this aspect of The Federalist, of course, that followers of Charles
Beard look upon as blatant propaganda-a transparent effort to paper
over the fact that we are witnessing the Ninth of Thermidor, not the
Fourth of July. It is true, the Progressive historian must wryly concede,
that the Federalists proved far more successful in damming the popular
tide with their counter-revolutionary constitution than did their French
and Russian counterparts. But this concession only leads the Beardian to
doubt whether the assorted goings-on in eighteenth-century America ad-
ded up to a genuine revolution at all. After all, we are by now familiar
with the real thing: revolutions that devour their children in a sea of blood
with the masses cheering on until, after popular passions exhaust them-
selves in an orgy of destruction, a Napoleon or Stalin emerges to rule the
inert mass of his countrymen. If this is revolution, then surely the Ameri-
can Constitution is counter-revolutionary. To put the point in terms so
perceptively developed by Hannah Arendt:
It is odd indeed to see that twentieth-century American thought...
is often inclined to interpret the American Revolution in the light of
the French Revolution, or to criticize it because it so obviously did
not conform to the lessons learned from the latter. The sad truth of
the matter is that the French Revolution, which ended in disaster,
has made world history, while the American revolution, so trium-
phantly successful, has remained an event of little more than local
importance.7
And yet, if there is any locale in which the revolutionary achievements of
the Federalists are to be seriously entertained, surely this is the place.
fails to defend the Framers on this critical point, omitting all mention of the subject from his Holmes
Devise history of the Supreme Court. I shall define a "Convention," then, as an assembly whose legal
right to make constitutional proposals is open to good-faith legal doubt; but which, nevertheless, pro-
poses to ratify these proposals by a procedure that plainly departs from pre-existing constitutional
understandings. For further discussion of the historical foundations and constitutional implications of
this definition, see infra pp. 1057-69.
7. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 55-56 (1963).
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2. The Problematics of Successful Revolution
To do The Federalist justice, turn your mind's eye to revolutionary
scenes that, through remorseless repetition, have become a part of our
common heritage. I do not want you to begin your act of legal reconstruc-
tion, though, at the climactic moment at which you and your fellow revo-
lutionaries triumphantly explore the wreckage of the old regime. Instead,
begin the action at a point when this final victory seems a more doubtful
matter.
Time One. You are surrounded by an ongoing regime-people occu-
pying governmental offices, declaring themselves rightful rulers of the ter-
ritory; others plotting and scheming to replace the present incumbents; the
masses looking upon these goings-on with resigned indifference: politics as
usual.
All this, so far as you are concerned, stinks. While the government says
it represents the people, you think this claim is just plain wrong. Despite
its undisputed mastery of established legal forms, you say that you-and
your comrades-are the true representatives of the People. Now such a
claim requires courage, no less spiritual than physical. Who, after all, do
you think you are? The New Messiah?
It may be possible for religious zealots to stop the conversation at this
point. But for secular democrats, things are inevitably more complicated.
Predictably, democratic revolutionaries will respond to the question of
their own legitimacy in three different ways. First, they will say that the
established government is systematically subverting the public good. This
requires, of course, an ideology that specifies the public good being sub-
verted. Second, they will portray themselves as possessing special virtues
that entitle them to the position of the People's true representatives over
other applicants for the position. Third, the leadership's claims to legiti-
macy must be validated by the concrete assent given by faithful followers,
who recognize them as the true representatives of the People despite the
fact that their meetings lack the formal sanction of law. Without such
validating conventions, you cannot be a revolutionary leader-only a
leader in search of a revolution.
Time Two. The old regime has collapsed; the established forms of le-
gal authority have disintegrated. You and your comrades have seized the
commanding heights, and proceed with the business of government. Quite
remarkably, you are now in control of the forms of legal authority. While
this, in a way, was what the struggle was all about, victory brings its own
embarrassments.
Revolution is a game any number can play. Just as you challenged
established authority, so can the next fellow. He too can proclaim his su-
perior virtue and your subversion of the public good before irregular con-
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ventions who speak in the People's name. Vigilance, and the effective use
of force, is a part of the successful revolutionary's answer to such rival
pretensions. But there is another part too-an explanation of why it is
wrong for others to usurp the usurper's crown.
There are two obvious answers to this obvious question of legitimacy.
The first is "permanent revolution." Here, the revolutionary elite denies
that anything really important has happened as a result of their accession
to the legal forms of authority. After all, the elite did not require legal
forms earlier to declare themselves the People's true representatives. It
was enough to present themselves to irregular assemblies as people of spe-
cial virtue in pursuit of the public good. And the "revolutionary legality"
that was good enough for those great times of glorious victory is certainly
good enough today. So hip-hip-hooray: onward in the People's service.
Anybody who stands in the way is a counter-revolutionary, who must be
consigned to the past or reeducated for life in a brave new world.
The other obvious answer is "revolutionary amnesia." Now that we
have seized power, let us forget how we got there. The law is the law. If
you do not like the law, then try to change it through the (newly) estab-
lished forms. Anybody who ignores the forms and violates the law is a
criminal. Criminals belong in jail.
3. The Federalist Solution
The most important reason why The Federalist is worth reading-not
merely by lawyers but by all thinking people-is that it proposes a third
way to solve the problem of revolutionary legitimacy. While rejecting the
possibility or desirability of permanent revolution, The Federalist none-
theless places a high value on public-regarding forms of political activity,
in which people sacrifice their private interests to pursue the common
good in transient and informal political association. While rejecting revo-
lutionary amnesia, The Federalist insists that the public-regarding form of
politics should become preeminent only under certain well-defined histori-
cal situations. When these conditions do not apply, the claim of the legally
established authorities to speak in the name of the People must be con-
ceded by all thoughtful citizens.
For the moment, it is unnecessary to analyze the particular principles
of Federalist constitutional science. The important points go deeper. Ac-
cording to Publius, the beginning of revolutionary wisdom is to recognize
that the future of American politics will not be one long, glorious reenact-
ment of the American Revolution. Rather than preparing the way for per-
manent revolution, The Federalist's task is to construct the constitutional
foundations for a different kind of politics-where well-organized groups
try to manipulate government in pursuit of their narrow interests. So far
1020
Vol. 93: 1013, 1984
Discovering the Constitution
as this kind of politics is concerned, the new constitutional arrangements
should trump ordinary political outcomes. Yet the very decision to mas-
querade under the name Publius indicates that Madison, Hamilton, and
Jay do believe in a kind of politics which, under certain conditions, justi-
fies a change in preexisting constitutional principles.
It is, of course, the kind of politics exemplified by the Federalists them-
selves. A key paper is Federalist No. 40,8 where Madison confronts the
fact that the Philadelphia Convention acted illegally in exceeding the au-
thority granted to it by Congress and the States under the Articles of Con-
federation.9 After threading his way through several legal arguments,
Publius drops his legalistic pose and asks how far "considerations of duty
...could have supplied any defect in legal authority.""0 The answer is
worth pondering:
Let us view the ground on which the Convention stood . . . .They
must have reflected that in all great changes of established govern-
ments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence
[to forms] would render. . . nugatory the transcendant and precious
right of the people to "abolish or alter their governments . ..," since
it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to move
in concert . . .; and it is therefore essential that such changes be
instituted by some informal and unauthorized propositions, made by
some patriotic and respectable . . . citizens . . . .[Indeed the Con-
vention] must have recollected that it was by this irregular and as-
sumed [method] that the States were first united against the danger
with which they were threatened by their ancient government;...
nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no
zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in
those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity
to the substance contended for. They must have borne in mind that
as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to the
people themselves, the disapprobation of this supreme authority
would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors
and irregularities.11
Hear the voice of the successful revolutionary. The highest form of politi-
cal expression is to be found not in formal assemblies arising under preex-
isting law, but through an "irregular and assumed privilege" of proposing
8. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 226 (J. Madison) (0. Rossiter ed. 1961) (describing
"difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking").
9. See supra note 6.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 251 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
11. Id. at 252-53 (quoting Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776)) (emphasis in origi-
nal). While the central argument on this point is id. at 251-55, important ancillary texts include id.
No. 39; id. No. 43.
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"informal and unauthorized propositions." If such proposals were ac-
cepted by irregular, but popularly elected, asssemblies, we are to under-
stand that the people themselves-the words are italicized in the origi-
nal 12-had spoken; and if the People approved the revolutionary elite's
considered proposals, this could "blot out . . errors and irregularities."
Strong stuff. At present, though, I am less interested in evaluating the
Federalist theory of constitutional law than in presenting it to public view.
From this perspective, the critical point is that The Federalist elaborates a
dualistic conception of political life. One form of political action-I shall
call it constitutional politics-is characterized by Publian appeals to the
common good," ratified by a mobilized mass of American citizens"' ex-
pressing their assent through extraordinary institutional forms.1 5 Al-
though constitutional politics is the highest kind of politics, it should be
permitted to dominate the nation's life only during rare periods of height-
ened political consciousness. During the long periods between these consti-
tutional moments, a second form of activity-I shall call it normal poli-
tics-prevails. Here, factions try to manipulate the constitutional forms of
political life to pursue their own narrow interests.1 6 Normal politics must
be tolerated in the name of individual liberty; 7 it is, however, democrati-
12. Are the italics significant? I do not know. Certainly if The Federalist were a 20th-century
text, the distinctive patterns of typographic emphasis (which I have verified in the original editions)
could fairly be said to have some significance. While I take note of the original italics in my discus-
sion, I appeal to experts in 18th-century typography to tell me whether it is appropriate to take them
seriously here. In any event, nothing important turns on the question-the italics merely give typo-
graphic emphasis to meanings already evident in the text itself.
13. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id. No. 46, at
299-300 (J. Madison); id. No. 49, at 316-17; id. No. 51, at 323-25.
14. Examples of The Federalist's recurring affirmation of the Revolutionary past and its assertion
of the ultimate need for mass mobilization may be found at id. No. 14, at 103-05 (J. Madison) (need
to continue Revolutionary tradition); id. No. 28, at 181 (A. Hamilton) (separation of powers facili-
tates popular mobilization); id. No. 39, at 240 (J. Madison) (need for form of government to main-
tain fundamental principles of Revolution); id. No. 46, at 298 (division of powers permitting mass
mobilization); id. No. 49, at 314 (necessity of keeping open "a constitutional road to the . . . people
• . . for certain great and extraordinary occasions"); id. No. 60, at 367 (A. Hamilton) (revolutionary
activity as a check).
15. The extra-legal character of the Convention has already been discussed, supra note 6, and
will be elaborated further, infra pp. 1057-70. It will suffice here to note The Federalist's recurring
assumption that the People best express themselves through episodic and anomalous "conventions,"
and not through regular sessions of ordinary legislatures. See THE FEDFRALIST No. 37, at 226-27 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id. No. 39, at 243-44; id. No. 40, at 250-55.
16. These interests may, but need not, be narrowly materialistic. No less threatening were factions
based upon narrow ideological ends-most notably the effort by sectarian groups to establish their
own Church despite the dissenting beliefs of their fellow citizens. Cf. id. No. 10, at 84 (J. Madison)
("religious sect may degenerate into a political faction"). Indeed, Martin Diamond persuasively ar-
gues that, of all forms of partisan narrowness, The Federalist finds material narrowness the most
readily controllable, and hence aims for a constitutional structure that seeks to channel factional poli-
tics into relatively harmless materialistic directions. See Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American
Way, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 39, 52-56 (R. Horwitz ed.
1977).
17. This is the theme of the most famous paper in The Federalist: No. 10. While the brilliance of
Madison's analysis of factional politics is generally recognized, there is a tendency to approach Feder-
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cally inferior to the intermittent and irregular politics of public virtue as-
sociated with moments of constitutional creation.
C. Federalist Political Science
Having established this dualism,"8 the next thing to ask is what The
Federalist proposes to do with it. There are two conceptual possibilities.
The first is fatalism. Here, the successful revolutionaries remain passive
as they are engulfed by the tide of normal politics. There is nothing they
can do during their moment of revolutionary triumph to prevent the fu-
ture factional disintegration of the American polity. The cycle of constitu-
tional politics/normal politics/constitutional politics will be played out
endlessly to the end of human history. The second possibility is constitu-
tional activism. Although there is no way to prevent the rise of normal
alist No. 10 as if it were a free-standing object, requiring relatively minor supplementation from
other papers. For an example of this tendency, see D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 4-5
(2d ed. 1971). And yet the very definition of "faction" used by Madison in No. 10 suffices to establish
the self-consciously partial character of the paper's analysis:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Rather than suggesting that all
political groups are necessarily factional, this Publian formulation presupposes the reader's capacity to
distinguish factions from movements that do aim to further "the rights of citizens" or the "permanent
and aggregate interests of the community." While the genesis and character of these Publian groups
are not elaborated in The Federalist No. 10, this shows only that No. 10's argument is self-
consciously incomplete, and cannot be treated independently of other papers in The Federalist that
undertake to deal with the nature of Publian politics.
It is, of course, the object of this Lecture to begin the requisite textual synthesis. To minimize the
inevitable controversy that such a reading will generate, this Lecture emphasizes papers that were also
written by the author of The Federalist No. 10. While there are obvious differences between the
Madisonian and Hamiltonian papers, see Mason, The Federalist-A Split Personality, 57 AM. HIST.
REV. 625 (1952), I do not believe they involve the bedrock principles of dualistic constitutionalism
developed here. Indeed, The Federalist No. 9, written by Hamilton, asserts its intimate connection
with the subject of Madison's No. 10, see THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72-73 (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961), and seeks to locate the fear of faction within the larger commitments of Publian
politics. Moreover, my dualistic reading of the text parallels some of the larger dualisms others have
detected in Hamilton's political aspirations. See Kenyon, Alexander Hamilton: Rousseau of the Right,
73 POL. SCI. Q. 161 (1958).
The best evidence of the fundamental unity of Publian thought is that the democratic argument in
support of judicial review, developed by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, only becomes fully
intelligible when viewed in the light of the Publian texts, largely written by Madison, that are dis-
cussed in this Lecture. See infra pp. 1030-31.
18. Indeed, Publius denies that he is developing a new conception but insists that he is building
upon a thoroughly familiar principle: "The important distinction so well understood in America be-
tween a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government and a law estab-
lished by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little understood and
less observed in any other country." THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 331 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). Recent historical work, moreover, tends to support Publius' confidence in his audience's mas-
tery of this basic distinction. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 257-390 (1969).
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politics,' 9 perhaps the Revolutionary generation can take steps that will
palliate the most pathological aspects of the normal condition. The aim
here is to use the resources of constitutional law to channel the ebb and
flow of normal politics in ways consistent with Revolutionary principle.
1. The Problem
It is plain that The Federalist's Constitution takes this second path. It
does not do so, however, in an optimistic spirit. Indeed, The Federalist is
refreshingly free of claims that Americans are somehow immune to the
diseases afflicting the rest of humankind.2" Instead, there is a constant
effort to reflect upon the lessons of modern and ancient political practice.
And these lessons are anything but encouraging. European countries of
American scale are veritable hothouses of despotism.2' Ancient Greek de-
19. The Federalist's pessimism on this matter is worth emphasizing. Publius' most elaborate
treatment comes as part of an important paper explaining why not all constitutional disputes should
be submitted to the general public for resolution:
Notwithstanding the success which has attended the revisions of our established forms of gov-
ernment and which does so much honor to the virtue and intelligence of the people of America,
it must be confessed that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multi-
plied. We are to recollect that all the existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a
danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord; of an enthusiastic
confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opin-
ions on great national questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by
a universal resentment and indignation against the ancient government; and whilst no spirit of
party connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its
leaven in the operation. The future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed do
not present any equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended.
THE FEDERALIsT No. 49, at 315 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Surely, one wants to say,
Madison knows he is exaggerating both about the unity of the American people and the seriousness of
the British threat. We must not permit doubts about Madison's historical report to obscure the basic
theoretical point: Americans can be expected to transcend factional politics only "in the midst of a
danger which represse[s] the passions . . . ." Id. It is the old saw about the power of the hangman's
rope to concentrate the mind wondrously, but raised to the level of collective political consciousness.
In case the point was missed, Madison devotes the next paper to variations on his theme. Since a
constant appeal to the people on constitutional questions will permit the destruction of constitutional
forms by self-regarding pressure groups, Madison next considers the merits of a regularized proce-
dure under which the public may undertake the task of constitutional review: Every seven years, a
group of Censors should be convened to discover and sanction all violations of the Constitution that
have occurred since the People last assembled. Madison responds that the spirit of self-interested
politics would simply degrade the constitutional forms of censorship, with the most powerful factions
manipulating their amplified power to speak in the name of the People. Instead of using law to force
a public-regarding politics into being, a collective effort to transcend faction should "be neither pre-
sumed nor desired, because an extinction of parties necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the
public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty." Id. No. 50, at 320 (J. Madison). The first possi-
bility explains the success of the Revolutionary generation; the second possibility can be avoided only
if the Revolutionary generation takes advantage of Federalist constitutional science to bequeath its
successors legal forms equal to the challenges of factional politics.
20. A particularly eloquent assertion of this point may be found in id. No. 6, at 59 (A. Hamil-
ton); see id. No. 31, at 196-97; id. No. 36, at 218-19; id. No. 42, at 268 (J. Madison).
21. See, e.g., id. No. 8, at 66 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 41, at 257-60 (J. Madison). The closest
model is Great Britain. But, for obvious reasons, this is not a model that American Revolutionaries
can follow with any great confidence. See, e.g., id. No. 69, at 415-23 (A. Hamilton).
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mocracies were transparently unequal to the military and economic chal-
lenges of aggressive empires.22 Worse yet, they were notoriously unstable,
constantly degenerating into turmoil and despotism as each group tried to
seize exclusive power to oppress the others.2"
In trying to channel the flow of normal politics, The Federalist cannot
indulge in the old trick of adapting a blueprint that has succeeded else-
where.24 Upon considering the materials at hand, the greatest political
scientist of the age, Montesquieu, concluded that republican government
could not survive without constant calls upon its citizens' public virtue.25
Yet it is precisely The Federalist's insight that constant appeals to public
virtue could not be expected to sustain the normal politics of the American
people.
2. The Scientific Solution
Against all of this, The Federalist can only place one weighty factor on
the other side of the balance: the peculiarly modern institution of political
representation. It was this invention of modern political science, not any
increase in the quantity of human virtue, which permitted the rational
hope that Americans might succeed where both ancients and moderns had
failed before them. 26 Representative institutions permit us to establish a
regime encompassing millions of people with different religious and eco-
nomic interests. Although each faction would gladly use political power to
tyrannize over the others, their multiplicity permits the constitutional ar-
chitect a new kind of political freedom. Rather than suppressing faction at
the cost of individual liberty, the successful revolutionaries may hope to
neutralize the worst consequences of faction by playing each interest off
against the others. Hence the supreme importance of constitutional law.
By manipulating the forms of constitutional representation, Publius hopes
to drive normal politics into directions that do not endanger the principles
of the American Revolution-principles elucidated by the irregular meth-
ods of constitutional politics. 28
22. See id. No. 4, at 49 (J. Jay); id. No. 18, at 122-23, 124-25 (J. Madison & A. Hamilton).
23. It is this perception, of course, that generates the famous analysis of faction begun in id. No.
9, at 71-76 (A. Hamilton) and continued in id. No. 10, at 77-84 (J. Madison).
24. See i0. No. 14, at 100-01 (J. Madison); id. No. 37, at 228.
25, C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 21 (R. Neumann ed. 1949) ("The politic
Greeks, who lived under a popular government, knew no other support than virtue .... ), which
The Federalisi cleverly attempts to parry by citing Montesquieu against himself. See THE FEDERAL-
1ST No. 9, at 73-74 (A. Hamilton).
26. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72-73 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 10, at 77-84 (J.
Madison); id. No. 51, at 320-25.
27. The classic statements here, of course, are FEDERALIST No. 10 and FEDERALIST No. 51.
28. The dualist hope expressed in this sentence is developed most systematically in the six papers
beginning with No. 46 and ending with No. 51. It is therefore essential to study these papers together
in a single sitting, and resist the temptation to read them in one or another anthologized form.
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How to do this is the master question of constitutional design. Only one
thing is clear: Disappointment awaits all those who fail to understand the
distinctive character of representative institutions and who strive instead to
create a national government that resembles, as much as possible, the face-
to-face democracy of ancient Greece." The temptation is strong to simu-
late the ancient polis by calling together a few hundred people to "re-
present" the rest of us and reenact the ancient rituals of direct democracy.
This congress, not the people as a whole, will gather together in one
place, discuss the pros and cons, count heads, and declare the majority to
be the winner in our name. The rhetoricians have a name for this solution
to the problem of representation: synecdoche. In this figure of speech, the
part (Congress) utterly displaces the whole (We the People of the United
States) for which it stands in the representational system. But if we mis-
take Congress for the People Assembled, and give it supreme power, it
will act in a way that belies its rhetoric. In the words of The Federalist:
"The concentrating of [all power] in the same hands is precisely the
definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these
powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single
one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as op-
pressive as one. . . . As little will it avail us that they are chosen by
ourselves. An elective despotism was not the government we fought
for . ...
In short, political representation not only promises a solution to the an-
cient problem of democracy but provides the source of an entirely new
problem-misplaced concreteness or reification. Once again, I quote:
"The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem some-
times to fancy that they are the people themselves and betray strong
symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from
any other quarter . ...
In contrast to the doctrine of legislative supremacy, The Federalist in-
sists that no legal form can transubstantiate any political institution of
normal politics into We the People of the United States. Madison is most
explicit about this in Federalist No. 63. There, he rejects the popular
belief that the ancient world was entirely ignorant of representative gov-
29. For express, and repeated, rejections of the polis as a model for American constitutional the-
ory, see id. No. 9, at 72-73 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 10, at 78-84 (J. Madison); id. No. 14, at
100-01; id. No. 55, at 341-42; id. No. 63, at 384-85.
30. Id. No. 48, at 310-11 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jefferson with approval).
31. Id. No. 71, at 433 (A. Hamilton). Unlike the Publian texts quoted previously, this one is
usually attributed to Hamilton. For another notable analysis of the problematic way in which legisla-
tures represent the People, this time by Madison, see id. No. 58, at 357-61.
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ernment. In doing so, he clarifies the distinctive conception of representa-
tion upon which The Federalist pins its hopes:
In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive func-
tions were performed, not by the people themselves, but by officers
elected by the people, and representing the people in their executive
capacity . . . . [I]t is [thus] clear that the principle of representation
was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their
political constitutions. The true distinction between these and the
American governments lies in the total exclusion of the people in
their collective capacity, from any share in the latter, and not in the
total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the adminis-
tration of the former.32
Compare this text with the revolutionary pronunciamento, also written by
Madison, that I have already read.33 While Madison insisted there that
the "irregular and assumed" procedures of constitutional politics provided
access "to the people themselves," here he italicizes the claim that it is "the
total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity" which is the hall-
mark of the American Constitution during periods of normal politics. In
short, we must systematically reject the idea that when Congress (or the
President or the Court) speaks during periods of normal politics, we can
hear the genuine voice of the American people. Under normal political
conditions, the political will of the American people cannot be "repre-
sented" by means of any such naive synecdoche.
3. Master Concept: The Problematics of Representation
Yet, at the same time, Publius insists that his constitutional cre-
ations-Congress, President, Court-do "represent" the People in some
other way. If we are to understand this claim, however, we must use a
more general framework than that customarily employed in modern con-
stitutional law. Too often, we address the problem of political representa-
tion as if it could be understood apart from a more general understanding
of the problems involved in any and all efforts at representation-whether
they be in politics, art, or everyday language. Unless we attempt a more
general analysis of representation, however, we shall never come to grips
with The Federalist's hopes for American government.
Imagine, then, that you were planning a long and hazardous journey
and wanted to commission a painting which would "represent" you to
your loved ones in your absence. You have two choices. On the one hand,
32. Id. No. 63, at 386-87 (J. Madison) (emphasis in original).
33. See supra p. 1021.
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you may find somebody with photographic aspirations, who might provide
an image of you as you appear at the present moment. This mimetic kind
of representation has familiar advantages and disadvantages. Precisely be-
cause it tries to present a realistic copy of your appearance, it is easy for
others to read at a glance. Yet, for the very same reason, such a snapshot
is unsatisfactory. Perhaps an artist who self-consciously appreciates that
he cannot reduce your living reality to a piece of paper-that he is only
providing a representation-will paint a portrait that, while less realistic,
will nevertheless convey a deeper meaning to its audience. I will call this
semiotic representation, because it is impossible to interpret the picture's
meaning without self-consciously understanding that the picture is only a
symbol, and not the thing which the symbol symbolizes.34
It is in this semiotic way that Publius sets about representing the Peo-
ple of the United States by means of a written text-the Constitution of
the United States. To understand this document, we must recognize that
there can be no hope of capturing the living reality of popular sovereignty
during periods of normal politics. Rather than trying for phony realism by
supposing that Congress (or any other institution) is the People, the Fed-
eralist Constitution's first objective is to paint a picture of government
which vigorously asserts that Congress is merely a "representation" of the
People, not the thing itself.
The brilliant, but paradoxical, way that Publius makes this point is by
proliferating the modes of representation governing normal politics. In
Publian hands, the separation of powers operates as a complex machine
which encourages each official to question the extent to which other con-
stitutional officials are successfully representing the People's true political
wishes. Thus, while each officeholder will predictably insist that he speaks
with the authentic accents of the People themselves, representatives in
other institutions will typically find it in their interest to deny that their
rivals have indeed represented the People in a fully satisfactory way. 5
34. For purposes of gaining the broadest support for my argument, I have written this paragraph
in a way that gives maximal credence to the mimetic aspiration. That is, by defining semiosis as
requiring "the self-conscious understanding that the picture is only a symbol and not the thing which
the symbol symbolizes," I have allowed the proponent of mimesis to suppose that his form of repre-
sentation does not involve a similar form of symbolic self-consciousness. I do not believe, however, that
this naively mimetic claim can withstand scrutiny, see A. DArro, THE TRANSFIGURATION OF THE
COMMONPLACE, 1-32, 54-89 (1981). In my view, the mimetic form of representation is best defined
as the effort to suppress the interpreter's self-conscious recognition that the symbol is not really the
same thing as the thing it symbolizes, while semiotic representation conveys meaning only by provok-
ing the interpreter's self-conscious recognition of the representation's symbolic character.
35. This idea is succinctly presented in a famous passage of THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (J.
Madison); see id. No. 60, at 366-67 (A. Hamilton). Even more importantly, it motivates the last part
of The Federalist, beginning with No. 52-which seeks to show how the different branches of gov-
ernment will check each other's defects, and thereby yield a whole more "representative" than any of
its constituent parts.
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The result of the rhetorical interchange will be precisely the opposite of
each partisan's hopes. Rather than allowing the House or Senate or the
Presidency to beguile us with the claim that it, and it alone, speaks in the
name of the People themselves, the constitutional separation of powers
deconstructs all such naive synecdoches. As it works itself out in practice,
the system emphasizes that no legal form can enable any small group in
Washington, D.C. to speak unequivocally for We the People during nor-
mal politics. The House and Senate and Presidency merely represent the
People in a manner of speaking; each is a metaphor that should never be
confused with the way the People expresses its will during those rare pe-
riods of successful constitutional politics-when the mass of American citi-
zens mobilizes itself in a collective effort to renew and redefine the public
good.
Yet, while Publius begins his constitutional sketch by affirming its
character as semiotic representation rather than living reality, he does not
end there. So long as normal politicians are revealed as mere "stand-ins"
for the People, the Constitution also allows them to "stand for" the People
in a more straightforward way-by making its principal officials responsi-
ble, directly or indirectly, to popular election.36 There is no inclination to
deny the fundamental importance of recurring popular elections,"' only an
effort to establish that the pushings-and-shovings of normal politics are
not the highest form of political expression.38 Indeed, The Federalist tries
to assure us that the new Constitution will encourage the selection of po-
litical representatives who, even during normal times, will rise above the
parochialism of special interests.39
Nonetheless, the very effort to create institutions that will reward
statesmanship during normal periods only emphasizes the difficulty of the
task, the precariousness of the achievement. In the absence of a mobilized
mass of virtuous citizens, there can be no guarantee that the constitutional
machine will invariably produce tolerable results: "It is in vain to say that
enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and
render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will
not always be at the helm."40
This sober recognition drives The Federalist to a final institutional ex-
pedient. Given the danger that normal government will be captured by
partisans of narrow special interests, Publius proposes to consolidate the
36. See id. No. 39, at 241-42 (J. Madison).
37. See id. No. 53, at 331-36.
38. See, e.g., id. No. 46, at 294-95; id. No. 48, at 308-13; id. No. 65, at 397 (A. Hamilton).
39. See, e.g., id. No. 10, at 79-81 (J. Madison); id. No. 35, at 214-17 (A. Hamilton); id. No.
62, at 379-82 (J. Madison); id. No. 63, at 384-89. For a recent elaboration of this theme, see G.
WILtS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 177-264 (1981).
40, THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison).
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Revolutionary achievements of the American people through the institu-
tion of judicial review. When normal representatives respond to special
interests in ways that jeopardize the fundamental principles for which the
Revolutionaries fought and died, the judge's duty is to expose them for
what they are: merely "stand-ins" for the People themselves.
Not that Publius expects the Constitution to remain forever unchanged.
To the contrary, The Federalist explicitly recognizes "that a constitutional
road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out and kept open,
for certain great and extraordinary occasions."' 1 There will be future cri-
ses, new calls by future statesmen to put aside the quarrels of factional
politics. If all goes well, the People will, in its irregular way, prove equal
to the challenge.' 2 Rather than trying to immobilize the People, the Su-
preme Court's task is to prevent the abuse of the People's name in normal
politics. The Court's job is to force our elected representatives in Wash-
ington to engage in the special kind of mass mobilization required for a
constitutional amendment if they hope to overrule the earlier achievements
of the American Revolution.43 In the famous words of Federalist No. 78,
the democratic case for judical review does not
by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative
power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to
both, and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its stat-
utes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Con-
stitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than
the former."
The problem with a Supreme Court, however, is obvious enough. What
prevents it from misusing its constitutional authority to further one or
another factional interest rather than to interpret the meaning of the past
constitutional achievements of the American People?45 Indeed, is it even
possible to suppose any longer, as The Federalist plainly does, that some-
thing called judicial interpretation is an intellectually respectable activity?
I shall return to these questions in my last Lecture. My concern here
has not been with the possibility of constitutional interpretation, but with
the idea of representative government presupposed by modern constitu-
tional lawyers. A good test of my success is whether you have gained a
new perspective on the reading from The Least Dangerous Branch with
41. Id. No. 49, at 314.
42. Id. at 314-17.
43. Id. No. 78, at 469-70 (A. Hamilton).
44. Id. at 467-68.
45. Publius himself plainly believes that the courts are "the least dangerous branch," id. at 465,
and that the greater danger is judicial subservience to factions that have managed to gain a momen-
tary ascendancy in the other branches. Id. at 471.
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which this Lecture began. For recall that in his classic statement of the
countermajoritarian difficulty, Bickel focuses upon the very passage from
The Federalist that I have just recited. Rather than dismissing Federalist
No. 78 as, in Bickel's words, "nonrepresentational," we have used the
concept of representation itself to give the text renewed meaning. This
effort has permitted us to locate judicial review as part of a larger theme
that distinguishes the American Constitution from other, less durable,
frameworks for liberal democracy. In response to the perception that pub-
lic-regarding virtue is in short supply, The Federalist proposes a demo-
cratic constitution that tries to economize on virtue."8 The first great econ-
omy is purchased, of course, by the distinction between constitutional and
normal politics. The second is gained by a scheme of constitutional sepa-
ration of powers that normally gives elected officials powerful incentives
to question the success with which rival "representatives" have embodied
the political will of We the People of the United States. The third econ-
omy is obtained by designing an institution of judicial review that gives
judges special incentives to uphold the integrity of earlier constitutional
solutions against the pulling and hauling of normal politics.
In proposing a constitutional economy of virtue, however, Publius does
not take a simple Hobbesian view of the human condition. To the con-
trary, the entire machine presupposes a dualistic psychology: "The suppo-
sition of universal venality in human nature is little less an error in politi-
cal reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude. The institution
of delegated power implies that there is a portion of virtue and honor
among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence." 47
The task is to create a structure of government that, in both normal and
extraordinary times, will permit us to make the most of what virtue we
have.48 What more could constitutional law, or constitutional lawyers,
promise We the People of the United States?
46.
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who
possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society;
and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst
they continue to hold their public trust.
Id. No. 57, at 350 (J. Madison). The entire Federalist No. 51 is, of course, the most eloquent and
profound statement of this theme.
47. Id. No. 76, at 458 (A. Hamilton).
48. This is the root of my objection to the most influential modern interpretation of The Federal-
ist, to be found in R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-32 (1956). Dahl reads Publius
as if he were seeking to solve the problem posed in B. MANDEVILLE, FABLE OF THE BEES (F. Kaye
ed. 1924) and design a system of government that could produce tolerable results without any appeal
to the political virtue of its citizens. Unsurprisingly, Dahl finds Publius unequal to this challenge. His
essay brilliantly examines each of the weak links in the Federalist argument when viewed as an effort
to build a republic-without-virtue. Since Dahl's argument deserves serious consideration, I shall defer
a detailed examination to another time. For now, though, it will suffice to say that I reject Dahl's
guiding interpretive premise: The Federalist is not a failed solution to The Fable of the Bees, but a
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LECTURE Two: WE THE PEOPLE?
A. From Successful Revolutionary to Private Citizen
The last Lecture presented Publius as the epitome of the successful rev-
olutionary-whose immersion in politics is rewarded not by a lifetime of
failed hopes, but by an ongoing exchange with the People that culminates
in the collective affirmation of principles of national identity. For such a
one as this, the good life is the political life; the paradigm of virtue is
somebody, like George Washington, who gains his greatest fulfillment in
sacrificing private interest for public good. And yet, despite this pro-
foundly gratifying starting point, Publius transcends his historical situa-
tion to glimpse another possibility: a world of private virtues inhabited by
men and women who gain their deepest satisfactions in activities far re-
moved from the public forum. Needless to say, Publius views this possibil-
ity with something less than complete enthusiasm. From his vantage
point, these private people spell public trouble-factional indifference to
the public good. But it is a mark of Publius' greatness that he does not try
to suppress forms of life he finds distasteful, but uses constitutional law to
reach an accommodation with civic privatism in the name of human free-
dom. It is this act of self-transcendence that makes the Publian conception
of dualist democracy relevant to people living in vastly different historical
circumstances.
Notably ourselves. Putting aside all the obvious social and economic
differences that separate us from Publius, the hard fact is that we do not
live in the triumphant afterglow of the most successful revolution of all
time. When we say virtue, we do not immediately think of George Wash-
ington or his living equivalent (and who might that be?). I do not wish to
deny, of course, that we have had our political successes-and failures.
My point, rather, is that the political domain, as such, does not presently
dominate our moral consciousness. For the contemporary American, the
life of political commitment is only one of many paths to value. Virtue
and vice-meaning and meaninglessness-may be found in a bewildering
variety of lives. For us, a person who manages to preserve his integrity
and make his mark in politics is, doubtless, a person who merits great
praise-but any more so than the person who contributes to art, science,
or the less exalted business of decency, love, and thoughtfulness?
In a sense, the ease with which we raise this question only makes the
Publian economy of virtue more relevant to our political situation. If
politics is not the preeminent path to virtue, it is all the more important
for the Constitution to make the most of what little public virtue we can
profound effort to solve a different problem.
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expect. Yet, on a more superficial level, the very fact that Publius takes
public-regarding virtue so seriously is a stumbling block for those moderns
whose moral consciousness assigns it a more peripheral place. The princi-
ples of dualist democracy will be far more accessible if we show how they
make sense within our own problematic of virtue.
This Lecture, then, starts from a point very different from the one from
which Publius began. Rather than the successful revolutionary trying to
find a place for private life, I shall look at the Constitution from the van-
tage point of the private citizen trying to locate the rightful demands of
public life. In shifting interpretive field, I do not mean to suggest that
Publius' vision is somehow obsolete. My aim is to show that, even if one
changes starting points dramatically, he can reason his way to the same
dualistic conclusions that constitute our Publian heritage.
B. The Dilemmas of Private Citizenship
In taking the part of the private citizen, I hope to avoid easy caricature.
The democratic dilemmas I shall elaborate do not arise in a cartoon world
inhabited by privatistic zombies in search of the latest cheap thrill. Indeed,
the best way to begin is by distinguishing the private citizen from someone
I shall call the perfect privatist. The defining mark of the latter is his
utter incapacity to take seriously the Publian effort to define a public pol-
icy that best fulfills the "rights of citizens and the permanent interest of
the community.' ' 49 Thus, when confronting the question, "What is good
for the country?," the perfect privatist acts as if this inquiry can be re-
duced to the question, "What is good for me?" While there are indeed
Americans who take this strongly reductionist approach to political life, I
will not try here to persuade them to abandon perfect privatism's manifold
seductions. Instead, this Lecture proposes to elaborate an alternative
stance toward public life which remains accessible to most Americans. For
most of us, our natural involvement with our personal destinies does not
preclude self-identification as private citizens, capable of responding in a
distinctive voice on questions involving the political community. Thus, in
defending the views I announce as a private citizen, I cannot observe that
a proposal will be to my personal advantage and leave the matter at that.
When challenged, I must at least say that I have done more than consider
my self-interest. Otherwise, I lose my standing as a private citizen and
appear to my fellows as a selfish person bent solely on egoistic self-
aggrandizement.
And yet, while most Americans answer to the name of private citizen,
49. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (defining faction,
discussed supra note 17).
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they have learned not to take their protestations of civic virtue too seri-
ously. Indeed, even gaining a rudimentary empirical understanding of a
national problem often requires a lot of work. While we may occasionally
make this effort, an ongoing commitment to informed citizenship may un-
duly deflect our energies from the innumerable struggles of everyday life.
Beyond the problem of information, moreover, tower the moral dilemmas
of American citizenship. A sober consideration of the national interest
may well lead one to conclude that local interests must be sacrificed to the
general good. Yet this message will be met with bewilderment, or worse,
by friends and neighbors who fail to look beyond their parochial interests.
It is little wonder, then, that few of us voluntarily shoulder the full bur-
den of Publius.
However understandable his limited engagement in public life, though,
the thoughtful private citizen must recognize that it generates three inter-
related problems for a democratic polity. The first is apathy. The exis-
tence of many private citizens may demoralize those who otherwise would
be attracted to invest greater energy into private citizenship: If so many
others give only a passing concern to national politics, isn't it silly of me to
maintain the struggle? The second problem is ignorance. Given their lim-
ited engagement, most people will not be in a position to make a consid-
ered judgment on most-sometimes all-of the issues that seem so impor-
tant to the few who follow the pulling and hauling in Washington, D.C.
And finally there is the problem of selfishness. Without undertaking a
serious examination of "the rights of citizens and the permanent interests
of the community," isn't it all too likely that one's first political impres-
sions will give too much weight to narrowly selfish interests?
C. Coercive Democracy
Apathy, ignorance, selfishness-without belittling these misfortunes,
consider the disaster that would follow upon a serious effort at their eradi-
cation. Call the cure coercive democracy. If most people don't take na-
tional politics seriously, simply force them to pay attention. Every day or
so, each adult citizen should be compelled to spend an hour or two dis-
cussing the issues of the day. Over time, this ongoing confrontation with
the issues will induce citizens to form considered political judgments. And
if the discussions reveal that the masses are caught up in the protection of
their petty local interests, doubtless we can train specially conscientious
Public Citizens who will lead their fellows to a genuinely national and
public-regarding view of the nation's problems.
It is easy, of course, to find this chilling vision of coercive democracy
entirely unacceptable. Today's private citizen joins Publius in condemning
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coercive democracy as a "remedy . . .worse than the disease."5 Doubt-
less there are times when a liberal democracy may rightly call upon its
private citizens to die in the defense of their country.51 The demands im-
posed in times of crisis are not to be confused, however, with the normal
place that citizenship occupies in the ordinary American's self-
understanding. Generally speaking, it is up to each American to decide
how much time and energy he will devote to private citizenship, how
much to private citizenship. If this means that liberal politics will often
suffer from apathy, ignorance, and selfishness, we will have to learn to
grin and bear it.
D. Levelling Dem'ocracy
While few ordinary Americans question these harsh political truths,
American lawyers fail to struggle with them as they puzzle out the mean-
ing of constitutional government in a liberal democracy. Instead, modern
constitutional wisdom begins from a very different starting point-one de-
rived from the Progressive, as opposed to the Federalist, tradition. Instead
of distinguishing between the constitutional conclusions reached by a mo-
bilized citizenry and the ordinary outcomes of normal politics, the modern
lawyer implicitly uses a model of the democratic process that precludes the
self-conscious recognition of the ebb and flow of political involvement.
This levelling approach to the Constitution sweeps aside the dualist's per-
sistent anxiety about the problematic way in which democratic govern-
ment "represents" the People during normal times. Instead, the leveller
advances a single-track conception of lawmaking that drives the dualist's
preoccupation with mass apathy, ignorance, and selfishness to the periph-
ery of constitutional thought. In this single-track view, there is only one
place in which the political will of the American people is to be found: the
Congress of the United States. If the Congress enacts a law, the People
have spoken; if not, not. It's that simple, and no talk about the problemat-
ics of representation should be allowed to obscure this fundamental
reality.
Not that levellers necessarily insist upon an utterly simplistic view of
single-track lawmaking. They may, for example, remark upon the ease
with which incumbent politicians can place their competitors at an unfair
electoral disadvantage. Indeed, an elaborate concern with this problem can
even reinforce the levelling ideal. It is almost as if the entire point of fair
50. Id.
51. Doubtless, too, there are occasions upon which citizens, when faced with this demand, may
conscientiously refuse to comply in the name of some ideal that is higher than demociatic citizenship.
My own views on this matter may be found in B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE § 62, at 293-301 (1980).
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electoral ritual is to preclude any inquiry into the depth and breadth of
the popular participation that lies behind a particular ballot count. If, in a
formally free and fair contest, every voter chooses between the candidates
on the basis of the winsomeness of their respective smiles, the leveller
would treat this result no differently from another election in which every
voter chose between the candidates on the basis of their position on black
slavery. In each case all the leveller knows-and all he needs to know-is
that by a vote of fifty-one to forty-nine, the People chose Candidate A over
Candidate B; it is therefore Representative A who is fully empowered to
rule in the name of the People until the next election.
This emphatic conclusion may be rendered rhetorically plausible by
two diametrically opposed characterizations of the American electorate.
On the one hand, the leveller may mythologize the citizenry, and treat
each and every voter at each and every election as if he were Publius,
preeminently concerned with the "rights of citizens and the permanent
interests of the community." On the other hand, the leveller may adopt
the stance of the hard-boiled realist and treat each voter as always out for
himself.52 The leveller may even flip back and forth between these very
different images of the American voter. The critical point, however, is not
the particular picture of the voter used by each leveller. Rather, it is the
leveller's failure to discriminate between those rare occasions on which
many people are investing heavily in their role as citizens and those fre-
quent occasions of diminished political attention and concern. Thus the
leveller's treatment of the voter as citizen parallels his treatment of Con-
gress as lawmaker. In neither case does the levelling constitutionalist pro-
vide a vocabulary that allows the private citizen or the politician/
statesman to signal that he is taking his public-regarding responsibilities
with special seriousness.5"
Despite the reductionist character of the levelling approach, however, I
do not wish to deny that it does offer a solution to the problem of civic
privatism which is vastly superior to that of coercive democracy. Indeed, I
shall be using the levelling conception of single-track democracy as a con-
ceptual baseline in my efforts to assess the dualist alternative. Thus, I
shall first emphasize the very important contributions that levelling makes
to the theory of liberal democracy, and only then consider whether dual-
ism can do even better.
52. While the classic work in levelling political philosophy takes a hard-boiled view of modern
citizenship, see J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 250-83 (1942), the lev-
elling tradition in American constitutional law sometimes adopts loftier, more Publian, characteriza-
tions. This is the general tendency, for example, in J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)
discussed infra pp. 1047-49.
53. For a recent essay that emphasizes this tendency from a more empirical point of view, see A.
HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS (1982).
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1. The Leveller's Contribution to Liberal Democracy
Begin, then, with the symbolic and substantive contributions levelling
makes to the liberal democrat's concern with the right of citizens to pur-
sue a private life far removed from politics. On the side of symbol, the
leveller assures each of us that our standing as full-fledged citizens is se-
cure so long as we are willing to spend a few minutes at the polls once in
a while. Even if we cast our ballots in ignorant or selfish ways, our votes
are counted as if they were the product of the most conscientious examina-
tion of the nature of the common good. So far as the fundamental ritual of
a mass democracy is concerned, the private citizen is allowed to reaffirm
his citizenship without the need to ask himself any embarrassing questions
about the quality of his commitments.
And then there is the matter of substance. The leveller has managed to
avoid the transparent dangers involved in forcing people to be good citi-
zens. Nobody is obliged to spend time tediously discussing the fate of the
Republic when he would rather be doing something else. Nobody is given
the dangerous job of leading exercises in coercive consciousness-raising.
While avoiding coercive democracy may seem too modest a goal for some,
the liberal finds it an achievement of fundamental importance.
Now turn the coin to consider the liberal democratic arguments in favor
of levelling. Beginning this time with substance, the levelling system
makes it hard for a political clique to monopolize political control. While
"ins" may beat "outs" in one, two, or three elections in a row, a demo-
cratic electorate remains a notoriously fickle beast. In time, the ballot box
will yield a victory to the outs-if only because the opposing candidates
have managed to convince the voters of the superior brilliance of their
smiles or the greater profundity of their advertising copy. The most trivial
levelling election, then, does serve important-indeed fundamen-
tal-functions. Even if elites are destabilized by almost-random electoral
shocks, the system of levelling democracy does give reality to the notion of
popular rule, and makes it harder for a closed circle to govern forever.
Levelling also promises the liberal democrat symbolic rewards. Rather
than emphasizing the problematic character of the citizenry's engagement,
the leveller can view each Election Day as yet another unambiguous tri-
umph for the democratic ideal. Behold: Millions upon millions of citizens
have once again played their appointed part in the ritual of democracy.
After all, nobody forced them to turn off their T.V. sets for the time it
takes to go to the polls!
I do not wish to deny the important truth attached to the leveller's dem-
ocratic symbolism. It is significant that so many of us have come together
at the polls to show that we have not forgotten that we can speak as We
the People of the United States.
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2. Levelling and Its Inadequacies
Yet, for all its advantages, there is a darker side to the liberal demo-
cratic compromise that is levelling democracy. Begin, once again, with the
liberal side of the story. True, the leveller does guarantee each private
person his standing as a citizen even though he lives his life with only a
passing glance at politics. Nonetheless, levelling democracy can be a very
risky business. While most of us are focusing our concerns upon other
matters, some of our fellow Americans work full-time at the business of
government. And they may well use their heavy political investments to
maximize their advantage at our expense. By the time private citizens
wake up to the threat to their fundamental interests, it may be too late for
effective political action. The full-time politicos may have entrenched
themselves on the commanding heights-all the while exercising the full
legislative authority of the People, as is their right in a single-track de-
mocracy. At this point, it may be impossible for political mobilization to
undo the consequences of earlier neglect. Moreover, even if counter-mobil-
ization proves successful, the effort required will divert the private citizen
from his most precious goals. By definition, these aims are not to be
achieved in the public forum and will not be nourished by an all-consum-
ing commitment to citizenship. In short, what the private citizen finds
wanting in levelling democracy is adequate insurance against a political
landslide engineered by well-organized special-interest groups speaking
with the full authority of the People.
Although his diagnosis is very different, the liberal democrat can sym-
pathize with his twin's dissatisfaction. However grateful he is for the lev-
eller's real contributions to the symbol and substance of popular rule,
there is more to democracy than the leveller will allow. Sometimes the
private citizenry is trying to do more than simply express its displeasure
with the ins by replacing them with the outs. Sometimes it is trying to
work out a considered judgment on a matter of principle-a judgment
reached only after years of popular mobilization and far-reaching debate.
It is just this affirmative conception of democracy that transcends the lim-
its of levelling theory. For, by definition, the leveller treats all acts of po-
litical participation as if they were accompanied by the same degree of
civic seriousness. As a consequence, he cannot mark those rare occasions
on which the American people do more than replace one set of ins with
another and instead announce a fundamental change in the constitutive
principles of the republic.
The problem, perhaps unsolvable, is this: Can we design a regime
which retains the very fundamental achievements of levelling but which
somehow ameliorates its liberal democratic disadvantages?
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E. The Promise of Dualist Democracy
This is the promise of the dualist constitution. For the present, I want
to defer all the vital detail required to make two-track lawmaking a credi-
ble constitutional reality. My aim here is to show how a dualist constitu-
tion-if it could be made to work in a legally credible fashion-would be
superior to the levelling form of single-track democracy. And for this pur-
pose, the simple concept of two-track lawmaking will suffice.
Begin, then, with the two-track system's promise to provide the liberal
democrat with some political insurance for the millions of people who
have better things to do than follow the goings-on in Washington, D.C.
Most of the daily political action will predictably take place on the lower
lawmaking track. And, by definition, nothing on this track can disturb the
fundamental principles previously hammered out on the higher track.
Thus, the private citizen is insured against a change in fundamental polit-
ical principles-at least so long as no new political movement is making
great progress in enacting its new principles into higher law.
At the same time, the dualist promises to satisfy the liberal democrat by
institutionalizing the very distinction that is obliterated by the leveller's
impoverished constitutional vocabulary. As in a levelling constitution, the
democrat may continue to find meaning in the fact that Americans regu-
larly go to the polls and sometimes replace one set of leaders with another.
Yet he may find deeper meaning on those rarer occasions when the Amer-
ican people do even more-when, after sustained debate and struggle,
they hammer out new principles to guide public life. For it is the very
purpose of the higher lawmaking track to mark these occasions as possess-
ing special and abiding significance in the life of the political community.
The existence of a higher lawmaking track, in short, has a liberal dem-
ocratic value both on those rare occasions when a new mass movement
succeeds in enacting new constitutional principles and during those fre-
quent periods when no profound constitutional transformation is being se-
riously considered. When the higher track is empty, the liberal obtains
insurance; when it is crowded, the democrat has a means of amplifying
the voice of the People in a way that will arrest attention for a long time
to come.
Despite its distinctive achievements, however, I do not pretend that du-
alism will magically dissolve all the difficulties that may be raised against
it. Quite obviously, it will not satisfy the perfect privatist who demands an
absolute right to ignore politics whenever he finds something better to do.
Similarly, it will not satisfy the strong democrat who wants to have the
People resolve all important questions all the time. More significantly,
dualism does not even promise perfect satisfaction to the thoughtful pri-
vate citizen. On the contrary, once a new political movement begins suc-
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cessfully to negotiate the obstacle course established on the higher law-
making track, each of us will be faced with a hard choice. Either we may
continue as relatively passive participants and run the risk of grave politi-
cal defeat, or we may increase the level of our public involvement and
sacrifice our more personal interests. Rather than deprecating the diffi-
culty of this choice, the dualist seeks to create a system in which each of
us can make our decision in a self-conscious and deliberate way.
F. What Does the Constitution Constitute?
Until now, I have emphasized the extent to which a dualistic lawmak-
ing system may reconcile competing aspects of the liberal democratic ideal.
There is, however, a second way of approaching dualism's promise. Here,
we move from the grand abstractions of political theory to the more par-
ticular difficulties that people encounter in the effort to communicate the
ebb and flow of their public involvements. To grasp the problem, put
yourself in the typical position of the private citizen. So far as you are
concerned, the victory of one or another political party in the next election
will not typically transform the shape of your world. In contrast, your
world will be shattered if your wife leaves you, or your job loses its attrac-
tion, or you embarrass yourself before your friends in some shameful way.
These are the things the private citizen normally takes with high serious-
ness; politics is a sideline, competing for attention with countless other
activities.
And yet you know that this sideline is different from others. Indeed, the
ordinary irresponsibilities of normal politics sometimes begin to offend in
a special way. Don't our so-called representatives recognize that there is
something serious going on? Can't they see that business as usual won't
suffice any longer?
Even as the private citizen says this, however, he must recognize a diffi-
culty in rendering his heightened concern credible to his fellow Ameri-
cans. For even now, he is not willing to sacrifice everything that makes his
private life worthwhile in order to give his all for the Republic. More
abstractly, while the private citizen is categorically distinct from the per-
fect privatist, he is no less distinct from someone I shall call the perfectly
public citizen, who insists upon the single-minded pursuit of the public
good no-matter-what-the-private-sacrifice. This means that the private cit-
izen confronts a special problem in engaging in political communication:
How can he signify his concerns as a private citizen without undertaking
the all-consuming commitment characteristic of a perfectly public citizen?
It is here that the American system of two-track democracy makes its
signal contribution. The manner in which it does so, however, is rather
complex. Call it the strategy of differential sacrifice. To see how it works,
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consider that a political movement takes to the higher lawmaking track
only at a high cost. For in fixing its sights upon a higher lawmaking
victory, it diverts its energy from the lower lawmaking track, passing up
the chance for cheaper victories that may further the more immediate in-
terests of its followers. While this fact discourages most political groups
from ever taking seriously to the higher track, it also gives those who do
make the sacrifice a way to signal their heightened civic con-
cern-without, however, requiring them utterly to abandon their private
lives. By allowing the movement ostentatiously to sacrifice lower lawmak-
ing opportunities for the chance at higher lawmaking victory, a political
movement can represent the concerns of a mass of private citizens with a
credibility that cheap talk of virtue can never bring. The sacrifice implicit
in higher lawmaking gives private citizens a credible way of saying to one
another: "This time, we really mean it!""
To forestall predictable misunderstanding, I am not suggesting that
when a political movement actually succeeds in clearing all obstacles on
the higher lawmaking track, a glimpse inside the innermost psychic re-
cesses of the movement's partisans would reveal hearts entirely purged of
self-interest and minds fully focused upon the "rights of citizens and the
permanent interests of the community." Indeed, if it were possible for us
to experience-and reveal to others-a pristine purity of motive, we could
dispense not only with the strategy of differential sacrifice but also with
the dualist constitution itself. Instead of the complex legal rituals of higher
lawmaking, we might simply display the purity of our motives and get on
with the public business at hand. It is precisely because we are psycholog-
ically complex creatures, however, that such "sincere" protestations of
simon-purity seem naive ways of establishing our claims to private citizen-
ship. The strategy of differential sacrifice, in contrast, provides a credible
way in which psychologically complex private citizens can mark out those
occasions when they mean to invest a certain aspect of their personality
with heightened significance.
The symbolic uses of differential sacrifice may be illuminated by a
glance at the way it works in more intimate spheres of life. Imagine, for
example, that we lived in a place where the legal institution of marriage
was unknown. In such a world, couples would still agonize over their
decision to live together, and devise countless subtle mechanisms to signal
54. Indeed, sometimes the added credibility gained by higher lawmaking may actually put the
movement in a stronger position in the lower lawmaking system than it would have occupied had it
concentrated exclusively upon lower-track lawmaking. This result is not inconsistent with the argu-
ment in the text; all that it suggests is that the credibility purchased by a group's willingness to bear
the differential costs of higher lawmaking may sometimes prove an exceedingly valuable political
investment-so valuable that its payoff in lower-lawmaking efficacy offsets the costs in time and
money previously diverted to the higher lawmaking track.
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to one another the special meanings they attach to their relationship. Yet
this ongoing effort at communication would be immeasurably enhanced by
the legal form of marriage-through which parties self-consciously expose
themselves to heavy costs if they later act inconsistently with their protes-
tations of love and affection. The point of such a costly ceremony is not
primarily to serve as a snapshot of the love and hate that attract and repel
the parties to the ongoing relationship; rather, it is to provide a symbolic
system through which psychologically complex people can give a special
meaning to a form of interaction and thereby constitute it as a special kind
of community, distinct from the ordinary relations of everyday personal
existence.
Constitutional dualism provides a similar symbolic system in the public
realm. By providing a higher lawmaking system, the American Constitu-
tion succeeds in constituting something more than a government in Wash-
ington, D.C. It constitutes a system of political meanings that enable all
Americans to indicate the rare occasions when they mean to present them-
selves to one another as private citizens, and mark them off from the
countless ordinary occasions when they are content to understand them-
selves as merely private citizens-for whom political life is but one of
many diversions in the ongoing pursuit of happiness. 5
Not that every effort at establishing our claim to private citizenship is
fated to meet with Publian success. Instead, we must expect that most of
our fellow citizens will look upon most political efforts at national renewal
with the apathy, ignorance, and selfishness characteristic of normal life in
a liberal democracy. And yet, from time to time, some would-be Publians
begin to strike a resonant chord; their strong appeals to the public good
are no longer treated as if they were the ravings of fringe elements in
American society. Instead of encountering ignorance or contempt, the new
55. This formulation extends the original Publian insight into the semiotic character of represen-
tation, see supra pp. 1027-28, to the one subject which somehow escaped Publius' attention-the
representative pretensions of Publius himself. However much he insisted upon the merely representa-
tive character of normal politicians, Publius claimed a very different kind of status for the Federalist
effort to represent We the People. So far as Publius is concerned, the Federalists were not mere
representatives. They were the real thing: the People themselves (to recall Madison's italics).
And yet we cannot allow Publius to exempt himself from his own insight into the semiotic character
of representation. Indeed, if we do so, we shall only succeed in providing grist for the neo-Beardian
debunkers who aim to destroy the Publian tradition. For if the Framers are viewed as representing
what was "really" going on in America in the 1780's, it is child's play to develop other snapshots that
will place their depiction of We the People in a very different light. Not only will countless historians
enumerate the countless patriotic folk who rejected the Federalist program, in our privatistic age we
would be downright disappointed if some psychoanalyst could not elaborate the darker impulses that
"really" accounted for Madison's decision to take on the pseudonym Publius. It is only when we
understand the Federalist exercise in higher lawmaking as a contribution to a semiotic, rather than a
mimetic, system of representation that we may grasp its enduring significance. Rather than providing
a snapshot of any reality beyond itself, higher lawmaking provides Americans with a vastly enriched
vocabulary through which they can express the necessarily complex character of their relationship to
the ebb and flow of political life in a liberal democracy.
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movement is taken seriously by more and more Americans-even when
they find its message deeply repugnant. In turn, the movement's success in
penetrating political consciousness provokes a general effort to assess its
ultimate significance: Is it a passing fad or something of genuine public
significance? Slowly the half-remembered rituals of higher lawmaking be-
gin to take on a deeper meaning, for it is through these rituals that we
may test the seriousness of our fellow Americans' effort at national re-
newal and redefinition. Needless to say, most movements will fail to gen-
erate the kind of widespread support for their Publian pretensions that is
required before they can constitutionally speak, once more, in the special
accents of We the People of the United States. But that, in a sense, is just
the point. If it were cheap and easy for higher lawmaking to succeed, we
would be debasing the remarkable collective achievement involved when
millions of Americans do manage, despite the countless diversions of lib-
eral democratic society, to engage in an act of self-government with a seri-
ousness that compares to the most outstanding constitutional achievements
of the past.
Constitutional lawyers do their fellow Americans an injustice, then,
when they adopt a levelling attitude to the dualist theory of democracy
affirmed at the Founding. Rather than treating Publius as if he were an
antique irrelevancy from a bygone age, we should recognize the Federalist
constitution as offering a distinctive solution to an ongoing problem of
self-definition-one generated by two, quite distinct, traditions out of
which the modern West emerges. The first, recalling the grandeur of the
Greek polis, insists that the life of political involvement serves as the no-
blest ideal for humankind. The second, recalling a Christian suspicion of
the claims of secular community, insists that the salvation of souls is a
private affair, and that the secular state's coercive authority represents the
supreme threat to the highest human values. When faced with this ongo-
ing struggle for ascendancy in Western thought and practice, the Ameri-
can Constitution does not seek an easy victory of one part of ourselves at
the cost of suppressing the other. Instead, it proposes to use the conflict to
provide the energy for a creative synthesis.
As Americans, we are neither perfectly public citizens nor perfectly pri-
vate persons. The Constitution of the United States constitutes us as pri-
vate citizens equipped with a language and process that may, if intelli-
gently used, allow for liberal democratic self-government of a remarkably
self-conscious kind. And it is the use of this language by the Supreme
Court that will concern us in the final Lecture.
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LECTURE THREE: THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT
A. From Private Citizen to Constitutional Lawyer
My last Lecture took the view of the modern American struggling to
make sense of his relationship to political life. For such a person, a key
question is whether our constitutional tradition significantly enlightens the
distinctive dilemmas of American citizenship. The answer is not to be
found in some superficial introduction to the doctrinal mysteries of consti-
tutional lore, but in an explanation of the ways in which dualist democ-
racy expresses the characteristic perplexities of modern life in a liberal
democratic society.
This democratic defense of dualism, however, is hardly sufficient for the
more specific needs of the constitutional lawyer. What is required here is
a well-developed explanation of the way in which constitutional dualism
clarifies a host of familiar doctrinal predicaments. While I hope to pro-
duce a book responsive to these professional needs, my aim here is to iso-
late pervasive anxieties that presently block a sustained effort at doctrinal
reconstruction. These professional anxieties take two related, but distinct,
forms: one on the level of democratic theory, the other on the level of
juridical technique. While both combine to cast grave suspicion over the
modern practice of judicial review, they do so in ways that will require
different dualist diagnoses.
The earlier Lectures make an analysis of the first anxiety, provoked by
democratic political philosophy, the less intractable part of our problem.
Here we need only complete the neo-Federalist critique of the "counter-
majoritarian difficulty" that is said to deprive judicial review of its legiti-
macy in the American democratic system. Since we addressed this claim in
the first Lecture's discussion of The Federalist Papers, our task here is to
translate the Federalist argument into a more contemporary political id-
iom-one that builds upon the vision of liberal democracy and private
citizenship developed in the last Lecture.
Even if this effort to dissolve the "countermajoritarian difficulty" proves
successful, however, we shall have only taken a first step toward an un-
derstanding of the modern legal profession's discontents. Our collective
anxiety about the Supreme Court is not exhausted by doubts about its
democratic legitimacy; no less significant is the uneasy feeling that the
juridical tools at the Court's disposal are radically unequal to the chal-
lenges of judicial review. Sometimes these perplexities find expression in
attacks on the very idea that constitutional interpretation could be any-
thing more than a screen concealing the raw facts of political power and
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personal predilection.56 No less significant, however, is the desperate en-
ergy with which more lawyerly types have sought to move beyond inter-
pretivism in the search for a credible conception of juridical technique.
This quest, needless to say, has led in many different directions-from
lofty appeals to the methods of philosophy"7 or economics" 8 or even proph-
ecy, 59 to more down-to-earth efforts to apply common law techniques to
constitutional problems.60 While these trans-interpretive enterprises differ
from one another, they all proceed from a common supposition-that
classical conceptions of constitutional interpretation are so radically defi-
cient as to be beyond hope of lawyerly reconstruction.
In confronting this pervasive suspicion, I am not searching for a magi-
cal cure that will suddenly restore the profession to a robust condition of
interpretive self-confidence. -What is required instead is a lengthy process
of recuperation, during which we reflect upon the peculiar historical con-
ditions that have made the very possibility of a lawyerly interpretation of
the Constitution seem so professionally problematic. It is here where dual-
ist theory can make its most immediate contribution by suggesting a new
view of our constitutional past that may allow us both to understand, and
ultimately to transcend, the current interpretive impasse.6 1,
B. The Intertemporal Difficulty
Before we can build on solid ground, however, we must reconsider the
levelling opinion that indicts the Supreme Court as a "deviant institution
56. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
57. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 131-49, 223-39 (1978); Michelman,
The Supreme Court, 1968 Tenn-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
58. See, e.g., Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 49; Winter, Pov-
ery, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
59. See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTrrursoN, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97-100
(1982); Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984).
60. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
61. This effort complements the renewed scholarly engagement with the concept of interpretation
revealed in the recent literature. See, e.g., Fish, Fiss v. Fish, 36 STAN. L. REv. (1984) (forthcoming);
Fiss, Conventionalism, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. (1984) (forthcoming); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,
34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Law and Literature, 60 Tax. L. REV. 373 (1982). Thus far, the
questions raised by this literature tend to be formulated in ahistorical and abstract ways: "What, in
general, is the nature of legal interpretation?" "How is it similar to, and different from, other kinds of
interpretive activity?"
While these questions are important, I do not believe that they get to the heart of our present
difficulties with legal interpretation. In large part, these perplexities do not grow out of some abstract
failure to appreciate the nature of the interpretive enterprise, but out of a particular series of histori-
cal conjunctions which have deprived the legal community of confidence in its traditional hermeneutic
devices. This, at any rate, is the hypothesis that has motivated the present Lectures as well as much of
my other work. See B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984); B. ACKERMAN, PRI-
VATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
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of American democracy," doomed forever to bear the stigma of the "coun-
termajoritarian difficulty." To put this familiar charge in dualistic per-
spective, consider the obvious sense in which it is false. When the Court
invokes the Constitution, it appeals to legal enactments that were approved
by a whole series of majorities-namely the majorities of those representa-
tive bodies that proposed and ratified the original Constitution and its
subsequent amendments. Rather than a countermajoritarian difficulty, the
familiar platitude identifies an intertemporal difficulty.
As befits a platitude, the truth on which the intertemporal difficulty
stands is both simple and basic: Courts are generally expected to follow
the last word enacted into law. Judicial review, however, requires the Su-
preme Court to reverse this rule and insist upon its reading of the Consti-
tution despite contrary instructions by later, popularly elected representa-
tives. It is this reversal of the ordinary temporal priority that lies at the
core of the charge of "deviance."
And surely the problem is a real one. Indeed, if taken with the usual
ceteris paribus clause, the intertemporal difficulty is irrefutable. Call this
the principle of the last word: Other things being equal, it would be anti-
democratic for the courts to reject a later decision of a representative gov-
ernment simply because it was inconsistent with an earlier one. The Peo-
ple must reserve the right to change their minds-otherwise we have
ancestor worship, not democracy.
But are other things always equal? It is this, of course, that the dualist
emphatically denies.62 In his view, our Constitution is one great effort to
distinguish between those rare acts of representative government backed
by the considered judgments of the mass of mobilized citizens and the
countless actions based on something less than this. By contrast, the con-
ventional wisdom of modern constitutional law takes a very different view
of the intertemporal difficulty-one that is consistent with the levelling, or
single-track, conception of democracy described in the last Lecture. In
contrast to the dualist's picture of constitutional peaks and statutory val-
leys, the leveller levels constitutional history to a single plane of legal sig-
nificance. So long as our legislators gain their seats through a process of
fair and free democratic election, the leveller refuses to consider the quali-
ty of citizen involvement that supports a particular enactment. On this
view, political decisions reached by one democratically elected assembly
can never have greater legitimacy than those reached by another. It is,
moreover, precisely this levelling premise that is required before the inter-
62. Indeed, I understand the last three paragraphs to restate the point initially made by THE
FEDERALiST No. 78, at 468-70 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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temporal difficulty may be translated into the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty by a straightforward, four-step argument:
(1) Ceteris paribus, courts should follow the last word enacted
into law by a popularly elected assembly. This is the principle of the
last word.
(2) But, under the levelling principle, political solutions reached
by a democratically elected assembly can never have greater legiti-
macy at one time rather than another.
(3) Therefore ceteris must be paribus, and a democratic court
should always follow the last legally enacted word on the subject.
(4) Since judicial review violates this rule, it is presumptively
antidemocratic.
Though it is rarely made entirely explicit, this bare-bones argument
plainly motivates much of the most distinguished contemporary writing on
the Constitution. To take an especially fine example, two features of John
Ely's book, Democracy and Distrust, serve to mark it out as an archetypi-
cal product of the levelling approach."3 The first is Ely's determined effort
to trivialize the substantive principles that have, as a result of past genera-
tions' successful efforts in higher lawmaking, gained the status of constitu-
63. While it is useful to concentrate on a single example, it is important to emphasize the extent
to which levelling premises are accepted by a wide range of commentators who would reject Ely's
substantive conclusions. On this level, Ely's book is one of the most distinguished products of a legal
generation, now gaining academic ascendancy, that seeks to rationalize the fundamental doctrinal con-
clusions of the Warren Court. These doctrinal conclusions will, predictably, be challenged by com-
mentators of two different persuasions: those who believe the Warren Court went too far, and those
who believe it did not go far enough. The most thoughtful spokesmen for both these tendencies, how-
ever, are no less emphatic in their levelling than is Ely. Thus, while Robert Bork's doctrinal views are
far more restrictive than Ely's, his work presupposes the same model of levelling democracy from
which Ely's work proceeds. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971); see also Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tax. L. REv. 693
(1976).
Similarly, those who find Ely's substantive doctrine unduly conservative have been no less assiduous
in grounding their judicial activism on levelling premises. On the one hand, some emphasize the
extent to which the levelling ideal of free and fair elections is inconsistent with American social reali-
ties. On this line, the Court may well be required to move beyond Ely's moderate interventionism if it
hopes to clear the way for a truly democratic electoral process. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional
Law-and Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981). On the other hand, some scholars elaborate a
more legalistic form of activist levelling by positing the existence of a broad congressional power over
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. This allows the activist to read deep meaning into the fact that
Congress has refused to strip the Court of its review functions despite the provocations of judicial
interventionism. On this line, so long as Congress continues to grant the Supreme Court jurisdiction
over constitutional issues, the answer to the question of democratic legitimacy is quite straightforward:
Since, on levelling premises, Congress is the People's best representative, the congressional grant of
jurisdiction is equivalent to the People's endorsement of activist judicial review. See, e.g., C. BLACK,
DECISION ACCORDING TO LAw 37-39 (1981); M. PERRY, supra note 59, at 128-39.
Of course, this route to activism comes at a heavy price for the dualist-for it would permit a single
Congress to eliminate the practice of judicial review in a single statute. But this conclusion only serves
to emphasize the extent to which judicial activists, no less than conservatives, may adopt levelling
presuppositions.
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tional principle. Indeed, so far as Ely is concerned, the history of our
Constitution reveals that the very effort to guarantee substantive rights
through higher lawmaking is a misconceived adventure.6 4
This first conclusion prepares the way for a second. For Ely does not
propose to respond to his impoverished conception of higher lawmaking
by abolishing judicial review. Instead, he seeks to give the Court a new
mission by directing its attention to the machinery of lower-track lawmak-
ing. In his view, private citizens can legitimately expect that the courts
will protect only those constitutional rights which keep our regularly
elected representatives electorally accountable and suitably broad-minded
in the exercise of their lower-track functions.65
No less remarkable than these conclusions is Ely's effort to present
them as the most mature product of an "ultimate interpretivism" based
upon the constitutional text itself.66 After all, Ely asks, doesn't our Consti-
tution devote far more of its language to matters of process than it does to
matters of substance? Doesn't this textual concern with process gain its
fulfillment in Ely's image of a Supreme Court bent upon assuring the
democratic legitimacy of an electorally responsive and broad-minded
Congress?
It is here where the dualist must raise the cry of non sequitur. Granted,
the Constitution speaks elaborately about democratic process. But the very
complexity of the text belies Ely's interpretation of its overriding intent.
Rather than reinforcing the democratic pretensions of our normal politi-
cians in the manner of Ely, our Constitution makes their claim to speak
for the People problematic-setting House against Senate, President
against both, and staggering terms of office to make it extremely difficult
for a single group of politicians to dominate all lawmaking organs on the
basis of a single election. Rather than trying to make sense of all this
textual and institutional complexity, Ely "reads" our Constitution as if
the elaborate lawmaking relationships created by Articles I, II, IV, and V
somehow established a stripped-down version of British parliamentary
government-in which plenary lawmaking authority was vested in a sin-
gle House of Commons that renewed its electoral mandate periodically in
a free and fair democratic contest.
Constitutional lawyers, however, can no longer allow Anglophile senti-
ments, inherited from the Progressive Era, to blind them to the distinctive
dualistic logic of their own democratic system."7 While we may devoutly
64. J. ELY, supra note 52, at 99.
65. Id. at 73-104, 135-180.
66. Id. at 88.
67. For some further reflections on the British model, see Ackerman & Charney, Canada at the
Constitutional Crossroads, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1984).
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hope for the day when the Congress of the United States is dominated by
men and women with the democratic values and broad vision of John Ely,
we may never forget that our Constitution, unlike that of the British, does
not repose final lawmaking authority in any small group of representa-
tives sitting regularly in the nation's capital. Nor, as Federalist No. 10
warns us, is it premised on the expectation that "enlightened statesmen
will . ..always be at the helm."68 Only if our representatives move be-
yond normal politics and sustain a broad popular movement on behalf of
their principles on the higher lawmaking track does our Constitution al-
low them to make law with the full authority of We the People of the
United States.69
C. A Dualist Defense of Judicial Review
Rather than fixating upon the mechanics of single-track democracy,
American lawyers must learn to take a less threatened view of the past
higher lawmaking achievements of the American people. Quite simply, we
are neither the first generation of Americans to confront the ignorance,
apathy and selfishness of normal politics, nor the first to hope for a system
of government that will represent the People despite the problematic char-
acter of their political involvement. Once we reflect upon the difficulties of
this project, moreover, the fact that our predecessors are dead may come to
seem less important than the fact that, on occasion, they did succeed in
solving the very same problem we confront today in establishing a credible
form of public-regarding discourse.
Of course, even the statesmen who created our Constitution or wrote its
Civil War Amendments hardly convinced all their fellow Americans of
the Publian character of their concern with the "rights of citizens and the
permanent interests of the community." Universal consensus is not to be
found this side of Final Judgment. The most a flesh-and-blood political
movement can hope is that years of higher lawmaking activity finally gen-
erate a grudging, often bitter, recognition that it has earned the right to
present itself as representative of a majority of private citizens on a few
matters of basic principle, and that We the People have therefore spoken
in a particularly authoritative way. It is upon these rare achievements of
democratic politics that the dualist proposes to rest the democratic case for
judicial review. Before our present politicians can convincingly establish
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison) (G. Rossiter ed. 1961).
69. Not that Ely's concerns with the democratic fairness of normal politics have no place in our
constitutional law. Indeed, I think that some of Ely's own principles will survive dualistic reinterpre-
tation. My point is that only Ely's fixation upon a levelling conception of American democracy allows
him to imagine that perfecting the democratic legitimacy of normal politics could possibly serve as the
alpha and omega of constitutional law.
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that they are doing more than representing the judgments of perfect
privatists or thoughtlessly private citizens, should we not test their claims
against the paradigmatic higher lawmaking successes of the past?
When the Court tests some recent congressional initiative against its
interpretation of past constitutional solutions, it is not engaged in an anti-
democratic form of ancestor worship. By declaring a statute unconstitu-
tional, the Court is discharging a critical dualistic function. It is signaling
to the mass of private citizens of the United States that something special
is happening in the halls of power; that their would-be representatives are
attempting to legislate in ways that few political movements in American
history have done with credibility; and that the moment has come, once
again, to determine whether our generation will respond by making the
political effort required to redefine, as private citizens, our collective iden-
tity. In short, the Court's backward-looking exercise in judicial review is
an essential part of a vital present-oriented project by which the mass of
today's private citizenry can modulate the democratic authority they ac-
cord to the elected representatives who speak in their name from the
heights of power in Washington, D.C.
It is true, of course, that when faced with the Court's challenge, our
elected representatives may find themselves unable or unwilling to over-
come judicial resistance by successfully taking to the higher lawmaking
track to speak, once more, in the accents of We the People of the United
States. Yet, once we begin to question levelling presuppositions, the mere
fact that the People cannot be persuaded to overrule the Court hardly
suffices to stigmatize the Court as undemocratic. Instead, the recurrent
inability of normal politicians to succeed in higher lawmaking serves to
express the hard Publian truth about the difficulty of mobilizing a major-
ity of private citizens in a liberal democracy.
Nor will it do for levellers to respond to this dualist defense of judicial
review by trading epithets and denouncing the Court as unduly conserva-
tive, if not downright undemocratic. For this easy condemnation ignores
the extraordinary consequences that follow when, after years of long and
hard struggle, a political movement does gain the right to speak in the
name of We the People on the higher lawmaking track. Once a movement
has succeeded in enacting a constitutional amendment, it will no longer be
obliged to call so extravagantly upon the political energies of the Ameri-
can people. Its legal achievements will remain intact even when most pri-
vate citizens find, as they inevitably will, that they have better things to do
with their time than continue the political struggle at fever pitch. Despite
the inexorable return of normal politics, the movement's legal achieve-
ments will remain at the center of the consciousness of America's constitu-
tional lawyers, who should recognize a high responsibility to test the re-
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sults of normal politics in the name of constitutional principle. From this
point of view, the American Constitution is hardly a conservative friend of
the status quo, but an implement of revolutionary questioning during the
lengthy periods of apathy, ignorance, and selfishness that mark the politi-
cal life of a liberal democracy.
The fact that judicial review can seem both conservative and revolution-
ary at the same time only serves to belie the easy liberal/conservative di-
chotomies that make up so much of the Progressive legacy of constitu-
tional interpretation. However odd it may sound to Progressive lawyers
within the levelling tradition, the constitutional dualist is willing to assert
that the Supreme Court does not act undemocratically when it looks back-
ward to the legal principles enacted into our higher law by successful con-
stitutional movements of the past. To put the point more directly: The
democratic task of the Supreme Court is to interpret the Constitution of
the United States.
D. The Structural Amendment
This is a view more frequently expressed by the millions of Americans
who stagger through life without the benefit of a modern legal education.
In reasserting its relevance in polite legal conversation, I hope to do more
than reaffirm the lay understanding. For dualist theory also helps explain
why the layman's view is so threatening to the modern legal mind.
In remarking upon a pervasive professional unease with traditional
techniques of constitutional interpretation, I do not wish to overstate my
case. Especially when we look to the practice of constitutional argument
in the courts, we do not find the leveller's lack of concern with the mean-
ing of the constitutional past. To the contrary, events of fifty or two hun-
dred years ago are re-presented daily in the courtrooms of this country as
if they did indeed provide vital starting points for the constitutional solu-
tion of today's problems. Despite two full generations of levelling demo-
cratic theory and Progressive history, the practice of constitutional argu-
ment has not yet liberated itself from its deep connections with the higher
lawmaking achievements of the American People.
The problem of interpretive credibility arises only when we inspect the
general outlines of the story lawyers tell themselves as they search for a
usable past that will enlighten the constitutional present. Speaking sche-
matically, this historical story is dominated by three peaks of high impor-
tance that tower over valleys full of more particular meanings. The first
peak, of course, is the Founding itself: the framing of the original Consti-
tution and the Bill of Rights, Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v.
Maryland. The second peak is constituted by the legal events surrounding
the Civil War: the judicial failure in Dred Scott and the constitutional
1051
The Yale Law Journal
affirmations of the Civil War Amendments. The third peak centers
around the legitimation of the activist welfare state: the long Progressive
struggle against judicial resistance and the dramatic capitulation by the
Old Court before the New Deal in 1937. Time and again, we return to
these moments; the lessons we learn from them control the meanings we
give to our present constitutional predicaments.
While professional historians may greet this egregiously selective use of
the past with a mix of dismay and jubilation, I will not add my voice to
this particular chorus of condescension. Indeed, it is precisely because I
think that this peak-and-valley pattern does make constitutional sense that
a certain oddness in the modern pattern takes on a special significance.
Quite simply, the stories we tell ourselves to build up the constitutional
significance of the first two peaks-surrounding the Founding and the
Civil War Amendments-differ dramatically from the story we tell to re-
mind ourselves of the constitutional vindication of the activist welfare
state. When we look back upon the first two great constitutional solutions,
we tell a tale of constitutional creation. So far as we are concerned, some-
thing profoundly new came into being as a result of the ratification of the
Federalist Constitution or the Civil War Amendments.
In contrast, we interpret the rise of the activist state with a different
framework. Here we tell ourselves a myth of rediscovery rather than a
tale of constitutional creation. This view of the matter is obtained by pos-
tulating a Golden Age in which Marshall got matters right for all time by
propounding a broad construction of the national government's lawmaking
authority. The half century between 1880 and 1930 can then be viewed as
a (complex) story about the fall from grace-wherein some of the Justices
(not Holmes, of course) sinfully strayed from the path of righteousness
and imposed their antidemocratic laissez-faire philosophy upon We the
People of the United States. Predictably, these acts of judicial usurpation
increasingly set the judges at odds with the more democratic institutions,
which acutely perceived the failure of laissez-faire to do justice in an in-
creasingly complex and interdependent world. The confrontation between
the New Deal and the Old Court appears as the climax in a traditional
morality play of decline, fall, and resurrection. Only Justice Roberts'
"switch in time," and the departure of the worst judicial offenders,7" per-
mitted the Court to expiate its countermajoritarian sins without perma-
nent institutional damage. If only the Justices had not forgotten about the
countermajoritarian difficulty and strayed from Marshall's path, all this
unpleasantness could have been avoided!
70. The process began with Mr. Justice Van Devanter's resignation in the midst of the court-
packing crisis. See J. ALSoP & T. CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 108-09 (1938).
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It is with this exclamation that we come to the ultimate source of the
levelling tradition's power over the modern legal mind. Whatever else it
may accomplish, talk of the "countermajoritarian difficulty" has served as
a solemn professional vow to refrain from invoking the Constitution in a
last-ditch defense of laissez-faire capitalism against the modern activist
state. I have no doubt, moreover, that this pledge of self-restraint is en-
tirely appropriate. The struggle between the Old Court and the New
Deal did settle the question of the constitutional legitimacy of the activist
welfare state-at least until some future generation of Americans strug-
gles successfully to make laissez-faire capitalism part of the higher law of
the United States.
My problem instead is with the superficial myth lawyers presently use
to explain the process by which modern activist government gained its
constitutional legitimation. It is time to see through some bad Progressive
history that depicts the triumph of the welfare state as if it were somehow
foreordained, as if it were only some antidemocratic elite machination that
prevented the all-out repudiation of laissez-faire capitalism during the
long period of Republican ascendancy between the Civil War and the
New Deal. In calling for a fundamental reinterpretation, moreover, I do
not imagine myself a prophet crying in the wilderness. The seeds have
already been planted by a scholar who achieved his insights independently
of a self-consciously developed neo-Federalist theory. In a few brilliant
pages written nearly a quarter century ago,7 1 Charles Black presents a
revisionist account of the constitutional struggle of the 1930's. Rather than
looking upon the Old Court's resistance to the New Deal as if it were
conceived in original sin, Black emphasizes the positive way in which a
sustained period of extraordinary institutional conflict can contribute to
the legitimacy accorded to the final constitutional resolution.
Let me put Black's point in explicitly dualistic terms. During the New
Deal's first term, the President and Congress were no more entitled to
pretend that they were speaking for We the People of the United States
than any normal set of incumbents sitting in Washington, D.C. Moreover,
the hard truth is that the New Deal did raise fundamental questions of
constitutional legitimacy when viewed against the background of the indi-
vidualistic principles enunciated after the American Revolution and the
Civil War.
Thus, by resisting the initial New Deal experiments in the name of
traditional principles, the Supreme Court did not act in a constitutionally
illegitimate fashion. Rather than permitting elected politicians to evade
the fundamental questions of political principle raised by the New Deal,
71. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-67 (1960).
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the Court's resistance in the name of the Old Constitution performed two
vital higher lawmaking functions. Call the first th6 signalling function.
Just as, under Article V, the affirmative vote of two-thirds of Congress
signals the rise of a new constitutional proposal for sustained considera-
tion by the People, the Court's constitutional resistance during the New
Deal's first Term discharged an analogous function. The Old Court's op-
position made it abundantly plain to the mass of private citizens that a
fundamental constitutional initiative was being seriously entertained by
their representatives in the nation's capital. If they did not approve of the
new things that were being said in their name in Washington, D.C., the
time had come to mobilize, as private citizens, on behalf of the Old
Constitution.
Second, the Old Court's resistance served a vital translation func-
tion-one that may be analogized to Article V's requirement of a formal
written text for a constitutional amendment. While the clarity of legal
purpose exhibited by such writings can be easily exaggerated, the collec-
tive effort to write down a few legal formulae does serve an important
function: It forces the movement to shape its excited political rhetoric into
language amenable to long-run legal development. It is precisely this sense
of legal direction that the Old Court helped the American people achieve
in the 1930's. Like any reformist movement recently come to power, the
New Deal's first term revealed congeries of conflicting tendencies, embod-
ied in different statutory initiatives that were often frankly labelled as ex-
perimental. By resisting the initial experiments that most offended tradi-
tional principles, the Old Court forced the New Deal to clarify the nature
of its reformist purposes: Would the New Deal coalition retreat before
initial judicial resistance and wait patiently for the invisible hand to res-
cue the American people from the Great Depression? Or would it focus
its efforts on those innovations that exemplified its determination to trans-
form the laissez-faire norms which previously shaped the national govern-
ment's approach to economic and social issues?
By Election Day in 1936, the New Deal looked very different from the
way it appeared on the eve of balloting in 1932. At that time, nobody
could say whether Roosevelt's first term would be very different from
Hoover's term in office.72 But by 1936, a fundamental question of princi-
ple had been raised so decisively as to be obvious even to private citizens
whose principal concerns were far removed from the daily struggles of
Washington, D.C. It was not only that, after four years, the New Deal
had emerged as a concrete political reality. Thanks to the Supreme
72. The uncertainties surrounding Roosevelt's political orientation at the time of the first inaugu-
ral are thoughtfully discussed in F. FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: LAUNCHING THE NEW
DEAL 60-82 (1973).
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Court's discharge of its signalling and translation functions, the constitu-
tional status of the new reality was still in doubt. The New Deal was not
to be viewed as a fait accompli, but as a serious proposal to redefine the
nature of American government's relationship to the larger society. How,
then, would the People respond to the competing visions of constitutional
government offered by the Old Court and the New Deal as they pro-
ceeded to the polls in November of 1936? Would this election, like so
many others in American history, yield an inconclusive outcome, permit-
ting competing groups of normal politicians to continue battling indeci-
sively from the competing centers of authority established by the separa-
tion of powers? Or would the People react in the manner of the election
of 1896, for example, and give a decisive victory to the party defending the
vitality of the Old Constitution? Or, finally, would the People respond, as
they had last done after the Civil War, by giving the party of constitu-
tional re-vision a decisive electoral victory?
In short, I propose to reject the prevailing myth of constitutional redis-
covery and interpret the 1930's as a process of constitutional creation.
Rather than acting under the explicit procedures established by Article V,
however, We the People of the United States expressed its will through a
higher lawmaking process that relied primarily upon the structural inter-
action of Articles I, II and III of the Constitution. Through their careful
regulation of the terms of office held by representatives, senators, presi-
dents, and Justices, these Articles process deep shifts in popular opinion
very differently from a single-track constitution. Within our dualist struc-
ture, a single electoral victory by a new popular movement typically gen-
erates a highly charged dialogue among branches of government, rather
than a straightforward victory for the new order. Those officials who
gained office before the most recent election do not lightly accept the sug-
gestion that their principles have been consigned by the People to the
dustbin of history. So far as they are concerned, their rivals are transpar-
ent demagogues whose nostrums will only exacerbate the evils they pro-
fess to cure. Given the separation of powers, moreover, both sides are en-
couraged to appeal to the People in the hope that their own views will
emerge victorious in succeeding elections. If this process is managed well,
it will lead the adversaries to clarify the nature of the constitutional alter-
natives being proffered to the American People.
Thus, while the separation of powers operates in normal times to make
representation problematic, it can operate very differently during constitu-
tional moments-refining the issues of high legal principle involved in the
political conflict and thereby allowing Americans to place a constitutional
meaning upon a sustained series of electoral victories and legislative suc-
cesses that is very different from the meaning ordinarily attached to any
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single episode of normal politics. The democratic struggle over constitu-
tional principle will not end, moreover, until a series of decisive victories
at the polls permits the newly triumphant spokesmen of the People to
proclaim their new higher law from all three of the branches constituted
by the first three Articles. It is only at this point that a structural amend-
ment, as I shall call it, achieves its legitimate ratification under our dualist
Constitution as it has evolved over the past two centuries. 3
It is within this context that I want you to view the great judicial re-
treat of 1937. Rather than a confession of legal sin, the dualist sees the
Court's capitulation as the final point in the process of structural amend-
ment. It is the moment at which the judges recognized that a new consti-
tutional principle had indeed been ratified by the People, and that the
time had come for the serious work of judicial interpretation and imple-
mentation to begin.
Since, in this case, there was no written constitutional amendment to
interpret, the courts did the next-best thing-and promoted a case name
to the status of a constitutional text. Thus, when today's lawyers invoke
the name of Lochner v. New York, they are dealing with a constitutional
symbol with all the potency of a formal amendment under Article V.7 4
Moreover, they are right to insist that Lochner v. New York is the very
opposite of good constitutional law today. The reason, however, has very
little to do with the intention of the Framers or the work of the Marshall
Court. It has much more to do with the long process by which twentieth
73. While this explicit formulation is new, it builds upon two insights familiar to modern political
scientists. The first, having its source in Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy The Supreme Court
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957), looks upon the Supreme Court as part of the
governing coalition and interprets sustained judicial resistance to legislation as an unusual event,
symptomatic of a shift in the composition of the dominant political coalition. The second insight,
having its source in Key, A Theory of Critical Elections, 17 J. POL. 3 (1955), emphasizes the extent to
which certain electoral struggles-"critical elections"-provoke a fundamental redefinition of political
commitments by large groups of American citizens. For students of "critical elections," the rise of
New Deal democracy is nothing less than a paradigm case for their larger theories. See J. SUND-
QUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 183-274 (1973). It is possible to put my point within
these scholarly vocabularies: By virtue of its life tenure, the Supreme Court will characteristically be
the last institution to be dominated by a new governing coalition. This systematic lag is not, however,
dysfunctional within the larger constitutional scheme. Instead, it plays an essential role in the process
by which the American Constitution determines whether a "critical election" has occurred and what
changes in legal principle it has appropriately authorized.
Although his analysis is different from mine, David Adamanyi was the first scholar to grasp the
relevance of these themes in political science to the central problems of constitutional theory. See
Adamanyi, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 790.
74. Indeed, like some of our most important formal amendments, Lochner is a symbol of such
potency that it has generated a host of meanings far removed from the concrete problems raised by
New York State's effort to improve the health of its bakers by limiting their work week. While these
disparate meanings badly require systematic elaboration and discriminating evaluation, this is not the
place to begin the effort. For the present, I will be content to use the case in the traditional way-as
an omnibus term of opprobrium, condemning all that was evil in the Old Court's substantive doctrine
and judicial methodology.
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century Americans rejected the higher law handed down by the Supreme
Court in the name of their predecessors, and insisted that they too had
something to contribute to the higher law of the American people.
E. Text, History, Structure
The immediate consequence of accepting a revisionist view of our legal
past is not, then, some revolutionary transformation of standing constitu-
tional doctrine. Instead, it is the hope of understanding the existing system
of legal principles in a new, and historically deeper, way. Despite this
lawyerly mission, it would be naive to expect a single Lecture to dislodge
the Progressive myth of constitutional rediscovery from its central position
in our legal universe. While I am presently completing a book-length de-
velopment of the arguments sketched here, my present aim is merely to
convince you that the current myth can stand some agonizing reappraisal.
Given this purpose, a heap of legal detail is not as important as a sense of
the way my sketch of the structural amendment proceeds from a larger
reinterpretation of the higher lawmaking process. This reexamination
must begin, of course, with the text of Article V itself-a text that has
been drained of its higher-law meanings as a consequence of the levelling
tradition's intellectual ascendancy.
So far as the leveller is concerned, Article V enters into the argument
about judicial review only as an afterthought, after the undemocratic char-
acter of judicial review has been established through a chain of reasoning
similar to the four-step argument presented at the beginning of this Lec-
ture."5 Even when Article V is allowed to enter the field of dispute, more-
over, the leveller's principal object is to dismiss the text as an obviously
inadequate answer to the countermajoritarian difficulty. Granted, the fa-
miliar refutation runs, 78 the Supreme Court's judgment may be overruled
by constitutional amendment. But this process is so cumbersome that it
can serve as a safety valve only -under the most extreme conditions. In the
more typical case, the judiciary's political antagonists will fail to generate
the support necessary for a new higher-law solution, and the Court's con-
stitutional repudiation of Congress will stand as a valid exercise of
power-a result the leveller views as antidemocratic. Since he views Arti-
cle V as a patently inadequate safety valve, the leveller does not approach
the text in an expectation that it will illuminate the most fundamental
principles of American government. Instead, he regards it as a set of tech-
75. See supra pp. 1045-46.
76. In J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 4-60 (1980), the
levelling conception of the "countermajoritarian difficulty" is given its most comprehensive develop-
ment. The significance of constitutional amendment is dismissed in a single paragraph appearing
toward the end of a 55-page chapter. Id. at 49.
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nical rules, similar in kind to, and probably less interesting than, those
regulating the passage of ordinary legislation."
It is these low expectations that must be challenged if we are to redis-
cover our Constitution. So far as the dualist is concerned, Article V is the
most fundamental text of our Constitution, since it seeks to tell us the
conditions under which all other constitutional texts and principles may
be legitimately transformed. Rather than treating it as a part of the Con-
stitution's code of good housekeeping, we should accord the text of Article
V the kind of elaborate reflection we presently devote to the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
When approached in this way, the very surface of the text seems in-
stilled with deeper meanings. First, the text is patently inconsistent with
the leveller's vision of Congress. Even if Congress were composed entirely
of broad-minded statesmen elected by the fairest democratic suffrages, Ar-
ticle V insists that normal acts of legislation are not to be confused with
the considered judgments of We the People of the United States. Instead,
an extraordinary majority of Congress is merely given the right to propose
amendments, not approve them. Moreover, a rival institution may dis-
place Congress even from this role. I am speaking, of course, of the myste-
rious "Convention" that Article V explicitly endorses as an alternative
vehicle in the formation of the popular will.
It is this textual endorsement of the "Convention" that provides a tex-
tual bridge to a second fundamental theme: the Founders' profound recog-
nition of the limited extent to which they could legitimately specify the
higher lawmaking procedures to be followed by succeeding generations of
Americans. The Federalists were, you will recall,7 8 perfectly aware of the
problematic relationship of their own "Convention" to the preexisting
constitutional law of their time, and that, especially in their decision to
appeal to nine state "Conventions" for ratification, the Founders were de-
signing a higher lawmaking procedure that was plainly illegal under the
Articles of Confederation.
77. A recent Harvard Law Review features a spirited debate on Article V. See Dellinger, Consti-
tutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97 HARV. L. REV. 446 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Dellinger, Consti-
tutional Politics]; Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment
Process, 97 HARV. L. REv. 386 (1983); Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a
RestrainedJudicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REv. 433 (1983). See also Note, The Process of Constitutional
Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1979) and sources cited infra note 82. While I hope that the
Dellinger-Tribe controversy inaugurates a new level of scholarly engagement, we have a long way to
go before we generate a literature as rich as the one provoked by Congress' effort to maintain "legisla-
tive veto" over administrative rulemaking-which continues energetically despite the Supreme Court's
best efforts to put an end to the discussion. See, e.g., Elliott, INS v. Chada: The Administrative
Constitution, The Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 125; Strauss, Was
There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983
DuKE L.J. 789.
78. See supra pp. 1020-23.
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Given their own breach of preexisting higher lawmaking procedures,
the Convention's choice of language in Article V takes on a special inter-
est. After all, the Convention could have written a text that tried to limit
the precedential effect of their own extraordinary effort to redesign the
higher law track. For example, after explicitly authorizing nine state
"Conventions" to ratify its own handiwork, Article V could have explic-
itly denied that any future "Conventions" might legitimately play a role
in future efforts at higher lawmaking.7 Or it could have avoided all men-
tion of a "Convention," leaving the process of subsequent amendment to
normal institutions, like the Congress and state legislatures, or to a spe-
cially designed institution, like the Electoral College, that was plainly a
creature of the instrument that it proposed to revise. Rejecting such ex-
pedients, 0 Article V explicitly endorsed the possibility that future "Con-
ventions" might once again be properly called upon to take the center of
the constitutional stage. Moreover, the Article V procedure for calling a
"Convention" is obviously modelled upon the process by which the 1787
Convention was called into being. To put it mildly, the text generates the
greatest possible confusion about the precise constitutional status of the
Article V forms: If the original Convention could assume the constitu-
tional right to revise the preexisting formal ratification procedures, could
future "Conventions" assert a similar right to modify the formalities of
Article V?
One may, of course, avoid this obvious question by building an un-
bridgeable conceptual gap between the original Convention of 1787 and
any subsequent "Convention" held under Article V. On this formalist
view, the founding Convention must necessarily be an utterly different
creature from any subsequent Convention convened under Article V. For
that assembly was attempting to create, rather than bring about change
under, the provisions of the Constitution. Instead of taking the meeting in
Philadelphia as a model, any subsequent Convention should conceive of
itself as essentially similar in kind to Congress and the other federal insti-
tutions created by the Constitution. Just as it would be unthinkable, say,
for a simple majority of Congress to enact a valid law over a presidential
79. Indeed, in two particular areas, the Convention did seek to limit the force of its own prece-
dent. Article V explicitly forbids any amendment-by convention or otherwise-of the sections of
Article I dealing with the taxation of, or trade in, southern slaves. While this entrenchment clause was
given an explicit expiration date of 1808, a second guarantees forever that "no State, without its
consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." Ironically, it was just this clause that
was arguably violated by the Reconstruction Congresses after the Civil War. See infra p. 1066.
80. While I believe that constitutional interpreters should place very little weight on the secret
notes that Madison compiled during the Constitutional Convention, these do reveal that the Framers
considered, and self-consciously rejected, alternatives to Article V that did not envision a legitimate
role for "conventions" in future constitutional revision. The relevant materials are thoughtfully re-
viewed by Gunther, supra note 6, at 11-16.
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veto, so too it would be unthinkable for a constitutional Convention to
propose the ratification of an amendment in a way that did not involve the
consent of three-fourths of the states. Despite the remarkable act of self-
reference on the surface of Article V, this formalist reading treats the
Philadelphia Convention as if it existed on a different ontological level
from "Conventions" convened by future generations of Americans. The
mere fact that the Philadelphia Convention asserted its own right to revise
preexisting higher ratification procedures, and that Publius sought to jus-
tify it,"l is dismissed by the formalist as entirely irrelevant to a proper
reading of Article V.
It has been an aim of these Lectures to undermine the view of the
Founders presupposed by this formalist reading. Rather than looking
upon the Philadelphia Convention as an assemblage of demigods, inhab-
iting a constitutional plane closed to subsequent generations, I have tried
to approach the Framers as if they might serve as the paradigmatic exam-
ple of a continuing constitutional possibility-that despite the countless
diversions of private citizenship, we may, once again, speak in the higher
law accents of We the People of the United States. Given this effort to
rediscover the democratic foundations of our Constitution, the founding
Convention's departure from preexisting forms of higher lawmaking can-
not be treated as if it were an anomaly from a bygone age. Instead, by
explicitly allowing future Conventions to regain the center of the constitu-
tional stage, the Founders themselves caution future generations of Ameri-
cans against assuming that the last act of the American Revolution was
played out by the first Constitutional Convention.
This conclusion is reinforced by modern historical research into the de-
velopment of eighteenth-century constitutional discourse. Contemporary
historians have taught us to view the transformation of the meaning of the
"Convention" as one of the more remarkable political contributions of the
Revolutionary era. 2 So far as the English were concerned, the "Conven-
81. See supra pp. 1020-22.
82. The following paragraphs rely principally on G. WOOD, supra note 18, 306-43. Wood's book
remains the historiographic starting point for current work on Revolutionary constitutionalism,
though, of course, it has provoked a great deal of debate. See Shalhope, Republicanism and Early
American Historiography, 39 WMI. & MARY Q. 334 (1982) (summarizing debate). A systematic re-
view of the literature, however, reveals no sustained critique of Wood's account of the "Convention";
nor is Professor Wood aware of any scholarly dispute on this point. Telephone conversation with
Professor Gordon Wood (Mar. 13, 1984).
Historical scholarship by lawyers, as opposed to professional historians, has been much more nar-
rowly focused. Research here has been provoked by contemporary efforts to convene a "limited consti-
tutional convention" whose lawmaking competence is narrowly restricted to a specific constitutional
issue or proposal. In response to this effort, there has been the usual resort to "law-office" history of
uneven quality. See Charles Black's devastating critique of the ABA SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION STUDY COMMITTEE, AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION
METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V (1974) in Black, Amendment by National Constitutional Convention: A
Letter to a Senator, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 626, 632-43 (1979). In addition to Black's essay, Gerald
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tion" was a name for a legally imperfect body, such as one or both Houses
of Parliament meeting without the consent of the King. While such Con-
ventions might accomplish wonders, their legally anomalous character
rendered their actions of doubtful legality. 3 Thus, while the Convention/
Parliament of 1688-89 could oust one king and call another to the throne,
the English thought that the Convention's work required ratification by a
legally perfect Parliament, with William and Mary sitting in their proper
place.84
This formalistic view of the Convention was transformed by the Ameri-
cans who fought and won the Revolution. To them the legally anomalous
character of the "Convention" was a sign not of defective legal status, but
of Revolutionary possibility-that a group of patriots in a Freedom Tav-
ern might speak for the People with greater democratic legitimacy than
any assembly whose authority arose only from its legal form. Within this
cultural setting, it became appropriate to deny that mere legislatures could
legitimately revise constitutional law, and to insist that the People were
represented most appropriately by bodies whose very
name-"Convention"-denied that legal forms could ultimately substitute
for the engaged participation of American citizens. Thus, by 1787, the
received English view of the "Convention" had been reversed in American
constitutional practice: It was the act of a legally anomalous "Conven-
tion"-not one of a legally perfect king-in-parliament-that paradigmati-
cally expressed the higher-lawmaking will of the American People.85
Yet it is precisely this Revolutionary transformation in the higher-law
meaning of the "Convention" that the formalist reading of Article V
Gunther has also contributed a thoughtful survey of the scanty materials that record the Convention
of 1787's deliberations concerning the "convention" mode of amendment under Article V. See Gun-
ther, supra note 6, at 11-16. The most sustained contemporary discussion can be found in Dellinger,
The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979),
which makes good use of historical sources to support the claim that Article V only allows for a
"convention" with plenary authority over its own agenda. Dellinger does not consider, however, the
extent to which his particular findings are linked to a more fundamental assertion by the "conven-
tion" of its right to revise pre-existing legal forms in the name of the People. It is this latter question
that is of central concern here.
83. G. WOOD, supra note 18, at 310-11.
84. Thus the Parliament of 1690 enacted "an act for recognizing King William and Queen Mary,
and for avoiding all questions touching the acts made in the parliament assembled at Westminster, the
thirteenth day of February, one thousand six hundred eighty eight," which explicitly declares "Itihat
all and singular the acts made and enacted in said parliament were and are laws and statutes of this
kingdom, and such as ought to be reputed, taken and obeyed by all the people of this kingdom." 2 W.
& M., ch. 1, § 11 (1690), reprinted in E. WILLIAMS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONSTITUTION,
1688-1815: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY, 46-47 (1960). Recent work has only emphasized the
extent to which the members of the Convention/Parliament were aware of, and struggled with, a
sense of their legally anomalous status. Miller, The Glorious Revolution: 'Contract' and 'Abdication'
Reconsidered, 25 HisT. J. 541 (1982); Slaughter, 'Abdicate' and 'Contract' in the Glorious Revolu-
tion, 24 HisT. J. 323 (1981).
85. G. WOOD, supra note 18, at 342.
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threatens to reverse. No less than the pre-Revolutionary Englishman, the
modern formalist views a "Convention" held in violation of preexisting
constitutional forms as necessarily possessing lesser authority than a le-
gally perfect assembly whose title under preexisting constitutional law
was unchallengeable. Yet, in making this move, the formalist blinds him-
self to the very historical context that gave Article V's validation of the
Convention its distinctive meaning. Not 3nly does a reading of The Feder-
alist make plain the Convention's self-conscious breach with preexisting
constitutional forms, but it was this very breach with the standing forms
that served as the paradigmatic act distinguishing "Conventions" from
other assemblies in the constitutional language of the Federalists' contem-
poraries. Rather than ignore the remarkable way that the idea of a Con-
vention operated in the eighteenth century constitutional lexicon, the mod-
ern lawyer's task is to reflect upon the Federalists' reaffirmation of the
popular symbolism associated with the "Convention." Rather than insu-
lating Article V from the precedent of the Philadelphia Convention, sensi-
tive readers of the text must alert themselves to the possibility that future
generations of Americans might, like the Federalists themselves, be called
upon to elaborate the higher law of We the People of the United States
through legally anomalous lawmaking forms."6
And it is upon this textual ground that I propose to build my case for
the structural amendment. For it is precisely my claim that Article V's
affirmation of constitutional change through "Convention" has not merely
remained a textual possibility, but that the best interpretation of our con-
stitutional history requires the legal conclusion that We the People of the
United States have indeed amended our Constitution through "Conven-
tional" means.
This legal conclusion cannot, of course, even be entertained so long as
86. The way the constitutional convention lost its Revolutionary meaning for American lawyers
has yet to be adequately described. It would appear, however, that the Civil War was a turning point.
During the crisis of the Union, the use of the "convention" form was tainted by southern secessionists.
Not only did each of the Confederate states use the "convention" form to leave the Union, but North-
ern efforts to appease Southern demands were often expressed in proposals for extraordinary "conven-
tions" that would include representatives from both North and South. See H. HYMAN, A MORE
PERFECT UNION 41-49, 119-23 (1973). In response to the threat of these proposed "conventions,"
strong Unionists sought to discredit the very idea that "conventions" might legitimately revise preex-
isting constitutional procedures. See id. at 122. The most influential of these efforts was by Judge
John A. Jameson of Illinois. In J. JAMESON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1867), he explic-
itly recognizes the extent to which the South used the Revolutionary precedent of the Philadelphia
Convention. Id. at 2-3. It is the object of Jameson's massive work to do battle with this "misconcep-
tion," which he concedes to be "common among even the well-informed, that the Constitutional Con-
vention is above the law, the Constitution, and the government, all of which it may . . . respect and
obey or not at its discretion . . . ." Id. at 15. In contrast, Jameson seeks to demonstrate that the
"Constitutional Convention [has been] ... so transformed as to have become an essentially different
institution from what it was as a Revolutionary Convention." Id. at 15. Thus far, I have been unable
to locate any pre-Civil War text that remotely resembles Jameson's elaborate effort to de-revolutionize
the "convention" form.
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we cling to a purely formalist reading of Article V. Indeed, the formalist
history of the Constitution's "Convention" clauses is remarkably easy to
write. While Congress has once directed the States to ratify an amend-
ment by "Convention,''87 no federal "Convention" has ever in fact been
convened under formal Article V procedures. As a consequence, the for-
malist treats the history of this clause as if it were a perfectly blank page
from 1788 on.
Once we move beyond the formalist reading of Article V, however, a
very different approach to its legal history appears. First, we must reex-
amine the procedures that generated each and every written amendment
that good lawyers presently recognize as validly enacted. In each case, we
must candidly ask ourselves whether these procedures did in fact satisfy
the formal demands of Article V, or whether some other set of institu-
tional mechanisms played an important role in the process by which the
amendment was received into our higher law. Second, we must reconsider
the constitutional transformations that we have previously interpreted
through myths of rediscovery rather than through tales of constitutional
creation. Can we understand one or another constitutional transformation
in a deeper and more rigorous way by viewing it as the product of a rare
act of "Convention"-in which We the People expressed new higher-law
principles through the legally anomalous operation of lawmaking
institutions?
The structural reinterpretation of the 1930's is, of course, part of my
own answer to this question. It is, however, only a part, and one that
gains greatly in legal persuasiveness when viewed in the context of the
larger historical inquiry sketched in the preceding paragraph. For when
we begin to consider the legal history of Article V since the Founding, we
shall discover a certain oddness about it long before we reach the 1930's.
This has to do with a curious reticence on the subject of Article V's rela-
tionship to the Civil War Amendments in general, the Fourteenth
Amendment in particular. The mountains of scholarship that overwhelm
every other aspect of this subject contrast oddly with the scholarly void
encountered by the student of the process by which the Civil War Amend-
ments were proposed and ratified. Indeed, one searches in vain for a le-
gally rigorous and dispassionate analysis of the lessons this great
nineteenth-century exercise in constitutional lawmaking has to teach us
about Article V."8
87. The Twenty-first Amendment, repealing Prohibition, was ratified by state "conventions." See
A. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 110 (1978).
88. J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956), provides a scholarly
factual account. Twenty years later, James returned to his subject to find that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "was incorporated into law by a series of highly irregular and questionable procedures," which
culminated "in the most amazing proclamation of its kind in American history." James, Is the Four-
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A similar void appears when one shifts focus from scholarly literature
to judicial opinion. Since Coleman v. Miller,9 decided in 1939, the Su-
preme Court has virtually abdicated its interpretive responsibilities under
Article V. In deferring to Congress, moreover, the Coleman majority re-
lied heavily on the extraordinary powers assumed by Congress during Re-
construction in connection with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In the Court's view, these historical precedents endowed Congress
with special constitutional authority over the higher lawmaking process."
Although Coleman's dicta certainly could be narrowly confined,91 Con-
gress has, in fact, been the primary forum for the development of the
"law" under Article V since the case was decided.92 The result has been
teenth Amendment Constitutional?, 50 Soc. Sci. 3, 4 (1975). Rather than using these findings as the
basis for a reappraisal of the law of Article V, James' brief essay ends by treating the question as one
involving "only a matter of historical interest." Id. at 8. Other contemporary writings on this subject
were generated by the passions of the civil rights movement of the 1950's and 1960's. While some of
these papers make important legal points, they are presented in the manner of advocates' briefs, and
do not use the passage of a century to gain a deeper constitutional perspective on the legal struggles
dividing North and South during Reconstruction. Nonetheless, they are worth reading. For the South,
see Call, The Fourteenth Amendment and Its Skeptical Background, 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1961);
McElwee, The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Threat that It Poses
to Our Democratic Government, 11 S.C.L.Q. 484 (1959); Suthon, The Dubious Origin of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 27 TUL. L. REv. 22 (1953). For the North, see Fernandez, The Constitulionality
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 378 (1966). For some early discussions, see Note,
Was the Fourteenth Amendment Adopted?, 30 AMER. L. REV. 761 (1896); Note, The Fourteenth
Amendment Was Adopted, 30 AMER. L. REV. 894 (1896).
89. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
90. Id. at 448-50.
91. Coleman itself involved a writ of mandamus sought by Kansas state legislators against their
own legislative leaders and the state's Secretary of State. The legislators aimed to prevent the official
certification of Kansas' assent to the proposed Child Labor Amendment contending, inter alia, that
Kansas had already officially rejected the amendment and that the amendment was no longer a live
proposal thirteen years after its proposal by Congress. Given this procedural setting, the Coleman
Court was perfectly right in refusing to resolve the constitutional issues authoritatively. Quite apart
from the awkwardness of judicial intrusion into intra-Kansas legislative relations, a mandamus at this
stage might have entirely preempted Congress from an' role in the interpretation of Article V: If the
Court had barred Kansas from forwarding its assent to Washington, Congress would never have had
the opportunity to pass on the Article V questions raised by the state's action.
Surely it is better to reserve judicial review for a far later stage in the Article V process. As in the
case of the Child Labor Amendment involved in Coleman, most proposals will never come close
enough to ratification to warrant plenary constitutional consideration; moreover, Coleman was right to
find in the Reconstruction Congress' treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment-now entrenched by
fifty years of modern practice-a significant precedent for congressional involvement in the higher
lawmaking process. In short, judicial review of Article V issues should come only after a considered
congressional judgment on a fully mature Article V question. This familiar principle of judicial re-
straint was especially salient in a case like Coleman, where the proposed amendment's principal goal
was to overrule the prior Supreme Court decision of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Reading Coleman in this procedural way permits its reconciliation with earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions, stretching back to Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), in which the Court
displayed no similar inhibition in resolving Article V issues. Cf Dellinger, supra note 77, at 412
(noting that standing of Coleman plaintiffs was "dubious at best" and that "a good argument could
have been made that the case was not ripe for adjudication").
92. On this basic point, I am in entire agreement with Walter Dellinger in his recent controversy
with Laurence Tribe. See Dellinger, Constitutional Politics, supra note 77, at 392-96, 411-16. Del-
linger and I part company, however, on the way the Court should exercise its reclaimed interpretive
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predictable: Though no permanent damage has yet been done, the law of
constitutional amendment has increasingly been dominated by short-term
considerations of factional advantage rather than a long-run sense of con-
stitutional development. Instead of a deepening sense of the way the Re-
construction precedents might illuminate the legal understanding of Arti-
cle V, Coleman v. Miller has given us a half-century of increasingly
partisan congressional "interpretation" on the one hand, scholarly and ju-
dicial silence, on the other.93
It is just this silence that must be broken if we are to regain a sense of
the living meaning of Article V. A candid reappraisal of the use made of
Article V by the victorious Republican Party in the aftermath of the Civil
War will reveal a s~ries of serious legal problems for any thoughtful for-
malist. In urging a reconsideration of these "forgotten" legal difficulties,
however, my aim is not to relitigate the War Between the States.94 In-
stead, by rediscovering the formal Article V difficulties raised by the Civil
War Amendments, we may glimpse another possibility: that the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, no less than those of the original Constitu-
tion, were exercising the full powers of a "Constitutional Convention" in
the way they proposed to make their constitutional amendment a part of
our higher law.
95
In saying that the Thirty-Ninth Congress may best be viewed as a
Constitutional Convention, I have not, of course, ignored the fact that Ar-
ticle V explicitly contemplates such a "Convention" only after the petition
authority. Dellinger's reading of Article V is self-avowedly formalistic, id. at 389, 417-18, and aims
to reduce higher lawmaking to a fixed and stable system of clear rules. Given this reductionist aspira-
tion, it is hardly surprising that Dellinger entirely ignores the textual and historical arguments
presented in this section. Thus, Dellinger does not even try to make sense of the Reconstruction
Congress' actions within his own theory; these are to be dismissed, apparently, as "extraordinary," id.
at 401, or "self serving," id. at 405. Dellinger's earlier study of the "convention" clauses of Article V
suffers from a similar deficiency. See Dellinger, supra note 82.
This is not to say, of course, that Dellinger is wrong in asserting the utility of clearly established
rules in regulating standard instances of constitutional amendment. He is wrong only in making this
the whole truth about Article V. The relationship between rule and principle in the law of Article V
will be elaborated further in my book-length treatment.
93. The prevailing judicial silence was rudely broken by the Utah Supreme Court in Dyett v.
Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266 (1968), which elaborately asserted the Amendment's unconsti-
tutionality in dicta, concluding that it was only because of the Supreme Court's "superior power [that]
we must pay homage to it though we disagree with it." Id. at 415, 493 P.2d at 274. For a characteris-
tic reaction, see Firmage, The Utah Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Phillips and the Bill of
Rights in Utah, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 593.
94. The sources cited infra notes 88 and 93 raise many of the narrower legal issues that must be
confronted. In considering these issues, however, my book will not aim to treat them as if they could,
at this late date, be authoritatively resolved once and for all. Instead, my aim is to suggest that, in the
light of the serious legal doubts raised by a formalistic reading of Article V, our understanding of the
Civil War Amendments will be greatly enriched by supplementing a formalist analysis with the struc-
tural perspective sketched in the text that follows.
95. While a structural study of all three Civil War Amendments would prove rewarding, the
following sketch will focus exclusively upon the central historical event, the enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
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of two-thirds of the state legislatures. I mean to insist, however, on the
question-begging character of this formalist objection. 6 While the Article
V form might serve as an appropriate vehicle for many new constitutional
proposals, there is a paradox in insisting upon a state-originated "Con-
vention" in the aftermath of the Civil War. For it was a principal point of
the Reconstruction Congress/Convention to insist that We the People
were emphatically more than a confederation of states. To recognize the
binding force of Article V's state-oriented "Convention" form, then, would
have undermined the nationalistic foundation of the Congress/Conven-
tion's claim to constitutional authority.97
The Thirty-Ninth Congress took a far more appropriate course, given
its historical circumstances. Indeed, it was the very first action of Congress
during Reconstruction that signalled its extraordinary claims to constitu-
tional authority. When it first assembled in December of 1865, senators
and representatives from southern governments reconstructed by President
Johnson stepped forward for recognition on equal terms with those of all
other states. Rather than accepting the formal validity of these claims,
however, "Congress" excluded the southern representatives from its ongo-
ing deliberations. In so acting, the rump "Congress" was, of course, per-
fectly aware that it was taking an action that rendered its constitutional
authority legally problematic in the eyes of many Americans, in the North
as well as in the South.98
96. For my own working definition of a "constitutional convention," see supra note 6.
97. For this reason, postwar calls for a "constitutional convention" sometimes came from South-
ern sympathizers in search of a forum that would free them from the domination of Republican
nationalists. See H. HYMAN, supra note 86, at 442. There is, of course, an historical irony here: Just
when the word "convention" had been tainted in Republican eyes by its association with Southern
secession, see note 86, the Republicans themselves were holding a "Congress" that, with a century's
hindsight, is most suitably viewed as a continuation of the higher lawmaking tradition best exempli-
fied by the Philadelphia Convention.
98. It is, moreover, wrong to gloss over the legal dilemma with a broad citation to Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). While this case does, of course, reveal the Taney Court deferring
to congressional actions under the guarantee clause, it hardly ensured similar deference from the
Chase Court. See 1 C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1868, at 494 (1971) (re-
porting Chase's opinion that the McCardle Court would "'doubtless have held that [McCardle's]
imprisonment for trial before a military commission was illegal"' if it had been willing to reach the
merits, though Fairman believes that the basic principles of congressional reconstruction would have
survived judicial review). In any event, Congress' anxiety over the legalities of its position is best
evidenced by its refusal to allow the Supreme Court to decide Ex parte MeCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
318 (1868), 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), at a time when an adverse judicial determination might
well have jeopardized the Congress/Convention's effort to reconstruct the South in a way that would
assure enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather than unequivocally validating congressional activities, the Court's abdication in McCardle
only emphasized their anomalous character. The uncertainty prevailing at the close of the Civil War
about the constitutional status of the "seceded" states is discussed in H. BELz, RECONSTRUCTING THE
UNION ch. 10 (1969); H. HYMAN, supra note 86, at 433-45. A brief summary of the competing
constitutional positions may be found in E. McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION
93-119 (1960), which also contains a perceptive account of the way in which the 39th Congress' need
for plausible constitutional authority gave prominence to the theories of Samuel Shellabarger. Id. at
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But, as in the case of the Philadelphia Convention,99 this breach with
unproblematic legality could not conclude the issue. For the admission of
southern "representatives," many of whom had played leading roles in the
late Rebellion,'"0 would have radically transformed the nature of "con-
gressional" debate and decision. The enactment of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, moreover, paradoxically threatened to increase the role Southerners
could play in defining the constitutional meaning of the War. While the
Constitution previously counted only three-fifths of the black population
in determining Southern representation, the newly enacted Thirteenth
Amendment meant that all black freedmen would be fully counted. So far
as Congressional Republicans were concerned, this was simply intolera-
ble: An assembly o, erwhelmed by traitors would only stifle the voice of
the People.' 0 ' Rather than grounding its claim to legitimacy on an
unquestioning acceptance of legal formality, it was the Republican Party's
assertion of Publian virtue-its central part in the struggle to preserve the
Union-that provided the principal source of the rump Congress' consti-
tutional authority.
But it was one thing for the Congress/Convention to indulge in its ex-
traordinary assertions of authority in the name of the People; quite an-
other for it to earn the constitutional legitimacy required before its princi-
ples could be enacted into higher law. Ratification of the Congress/
Convention's constitutional pretensions, however, was not exclusively
achieved through the forms contemplated by Article V. Instead, it was the
separation of powers between the President and Congress that provided a
key mechanism for testing the legitimacy of the Republican Party's claim
to speak for the People. From President Johnson's point of view, the Re-
publican leaders of the Congress/Convention were not public-spirited
Publians but narrow partisans seeking to use a momentary advantage to
113. The Congress' ideological predicaments only gain greater saliency against the background pro-
vided by Michael Les Benedict's recent work on the conservative character of Republican constitu-
tional thought. See Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Recon-
struction, 61 J. AM. HIsT. 65 (1974).
99. See supra note 6 (discussing Philadelphia Convention's problematic legality).
100. On John Hope Franklin's reckoning, the would-be congressional delegation from the South
contained "[t]he Vice-President of the Confederacy, four Confederate generals, five Confederate colo-
nels, six cabinet officers, and fifty-eight Confederate congressmen." J. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION:
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 43 (1961). The preoccupation of the Congresses of the Civil War and Recon-
struction era with civic virtue and its opposite-treason-is elaborated by H. HYMAN, ERA.OF THE
OATH (1954).
101. See REPORT OF THE JoIrr COMM. ON RECONS'rUCION, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. xii (1866).
The congressional concern with this problem ultimately gave rise to §§ 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment-defining the terms of future southern representation in Congress. Any reader of the
Congressional Globe can attest to the great significance these issues had in contemporary debate over
the Fourteenth Amendment, see J. JAMES, supra note 88, at 55-66, though my interpretation of this
concern differs greatly from views presented by others, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
15-16 (1977).
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assure their long-run political ascendancy. 0 2 Consequently, the President
not only used the normal powers of his office to struggle against what he
viewed as a patently unconstitutional effort to deprive the South of its
rightful congressional representation,'0 3 but also sought to mobilize con-
servative Northerners politically in an effort to defeat his Republican ri-
vals at the next congressional election. 04 As the rigidly conservative char-
acter of the presidential challenge became apparent, Congress' decision to
propose a Fourteenth Amendment became central to the Republican
struggle for political supremacy. The proposed amendment served as the
central plank in the Republican confrontation with the President that
reached its climax in the congressional elections of 1866."0
It was the results of these elections that decisively shifted the balance of
authority between the President and Congress. Despite the unprecedented
effort by President Johnson to generate a new political party in support of
conservative Unionist principles, the Republicans emerged from the 1866
elections with an overwhelming victory throughout the North.10 6 Rather
than isolating Congress, President Johnson's conservative appeal had had
precisely the opposite effect. The newly elected Congress/Convention had
gained the popular mandate necessary to repudiate the constitutional
102. The struggle between the Reconstruction Congresses and President Johnson serves as one of
the great battlegrounds of American historiography. Compare W. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: PO-
LITICAL AND ECONOMIC (1907) (classic pro-Southern interpretation) and H. BEALE, THE CRITICAL
YEAR (1930) (classic Progressive interpretation) with W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS (1963) ("re-
visionist" account) and L. Cox & J. Cox, POLITCS, PRINCIPLE AND PREJUDICE, 1865-66 (1963)
(same). More recent work has renewed our appreciation of the conservative features of "Radical"
Republicans. See M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE (1974). For present purposes, how-
ever, I do not think it is necessary for me to take a position on many of the matters in heated dispute.
These largely concern an evaluation of the ideological position and social interests served by the differ-
ent participants. In contrast, my concern is to elaborate how the constitutional separation of powers
served to organize the constitutional debate. Given this purpose, any of the books cited above will
provide an adequate factual background for the discussion that follows in the text. Indeed, I have
found it quite enlightening to juxtapose writers with very different sympathies, in an effort to gain an
insight into the structural processes involved-though Beale's reductionist treatment of the constitu-
tional issues, see H. BEALE, supra, at 147, makes it a relatively unilluminating source.
103. The unconstitutionality of proceeding in the absence of Southern representation is a constant
leitnotif of Johnson's messages to Congress. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3349
(1866) (message on proposed 14th Amendment); id. at 917 (veto of First Reconstruction Act); CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 313-14 (1867) (veto of Second Reconstruction Act).
104. H. BEALE, supra note 102, at 113-38; M. BENEDICT, supra note 102, at 188-96; W.
BROCK, supra note 102, at 160-68; L. Cox & J. Cox, supra note 102, at 172-232; E. McKITRICK,
supra note 98, at 364-420.
105. See, e.g., W. BROCK, supra note 102, at 198; W. DUNNING, supra note 102, at 68, 71; E.
McKITRICK, supra note 98, at 449-50.
106. "The proportions of the Republican victory were quite astonishing: they won every northern
state legislature, won every northern gubernatorial contest, and gained more than two-thirds majori-
ties in both houses of Congress." K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 117 (1965). The
overwhelming victory in Northern state legislatures noted by Stampp was crucial for the subsequent
success of the Amendment's formal ratification by the states. For other discussions emphasizing the
critical importance of the 1866 elections, see H. BEALE, supra note 102, at 376-406; M. BENEDICT,
supra note 102, at 208-09; W. BROCK, supra note 102, at 153-60; W. DUNNING, supra note 102, at
82-83.
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pretensions of Johnson's provisional Southern governments-governments
which rejected the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite continued southern
resistance, and presidential obstruction, the Congress/Convention's sweep-
ing electoral mandate gave it the democratic authority needed to recon-
struct the South on a new constitutional foundation. And it is only because
this congressional struggle was successful that the Fourteenth Amendment
could ultimately gain the assent of three-fourths of the states. 107 To put
the point more generally, the separation of powers-here the conflict be-
tween a conservative President and reformist Congress-supplemented
Article V in a way that permitted our institutions to process the struggle
over the constitutional meaning of the Civil War in an organized and
democratic fashion."
And it is this conclusion that provides a critical historical bridge be-
tween the eighteenth-century textual affirmation of the "Convention" and
the twentieth century's practice of structural amendment. The separation
of powers served the nation well not only during Reconstruction but dur-
ing the New Deal. Of course, in the later episode, it was the President,
not the Congress, who played the principal role of constitutional innova-
tor; the Court, not the President, that provided the principal source of
institutional resistance. Nonetheless, on both occasions, these inter-branch
struggles served to signal the existence of a profound constitutional debate,
to refine its meaning, and to provide the People with the means of expres-
sing a rare determination to transform the character of our most funda-
mental political commitments as a nation.
Thus, the structural amendment that culminated in the 1930's is not
entirely unprecedented in the nation's constitutional history. Instead, the
struggle between the New Deal Presidency and the Old Court represents
a variant on institutional themes that revealed themselves at earlier mo-
ments of extreme constitutional stress and great legal achieve-
ment-notably those that gave rise to the original Constitution and to the
Civil War Amendments. Rather than content ourselves with a formalist
recital of Article V, our task, as constitutional lawyers, is to see the Article
for what it is: the beginning, not the end, of the history of constitutional
transformation in this country. It is only after we have reflected upon this
history that we can hope to do justice to our constitutional future. For
doubtless there will again be moments when political movements will try
to change our Constitution without strictly complying with Article V.
Given the ease with which such a step can be abused, no political move-
107. "The truth may be put in this arresting proposition, where latter-day readers may look at it
squarely: one must believe that if Congress had failed to bring the weight of its authority to bear upon
the ten states as then organized, there would have been no Fourteenth Amendment." C. FAIRMAN,
supra note 98, at 509-10.
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ment should be conceded such a right lightly. Nonetheless, our past his-
tory does reveal movements that have, after great institutional resistance,
earned the right to make this extraordinary higher-lawmaking claim. And
it behooves constitutional lawyers to understand these precedents with as
much depth as they can if they are to elaborate the nature of our existing
constitution in a legally compelling way.
F. The Possibility of Interpretation
This is, quite plainly, no small task. Since I very much want you to join
me in it, I should at least try to explain why all this effort might prove
worthwhile. And so let me close by explaining why I believe that a struc-
tural reinterpretation of our past is a vital preliminary for the reassertion
of the very possibility of a lawyerly interpretation of today's Constitution.
To see the connection, consider that our Constitution's explicit commit-
ments to the institutions of contract, private property, and states' rights
remain textually intact despite the retreat of the Old Court before the
New Deal in the 1930's. This fact, moreover, must be taken seriously by
any lawyer who believes in the possibility of interpretation. After all, if
the interpretivist is serious about interpretation, he cannot refuse to read a
text simply because he finds its message inconvenient. Yet there is only
one way to avoid revealing these classic constitutional texts as hostile to
the pretensions of the nationalistic welfare state of the last half-cen-
tury-and that is by playing so fast and loose with the traditional disci-
plines of legal interpretation as to make the entire notion of interpretation
seem utterly fraudulent."' 8 In doing so, of course, the interpretivist plays
into the hands of the legal nihilist. By trivializing constitutional texts he
finds inconvenient, he confirms the legal nihilist's loud insistence upon the
inevitably arbitrary character of judicial value imposition.
Moreover, so long as he fails to recognize the structural amendment,
there is no way the interpretivist can respond convincingly to the nihilist
critique. At the very best, he may desperately try to retain interpretive
rigor only when confronting those bits and pieces of the text that seem to
have survived the repudiation of laissez-faire capitalism in the 1930's
more or less intact. This selective interpretivism inevitably degenerates
into clause fetishism. Thus, modern interpretivists constantly speak of the
establishment clause while anxiously averting their eyes from the contract
clause; they look with awe upon fragments of the Fifth Amendment but
108. While leading commentators do not give this point elaborate discussion, it is not difficult to
find evidence of its recognition. Thus, according to Dean Ely: "[Tihe few attempts the various framers
have made to freeze substantive values by designating them for special protection in the document
have been ill-fated, normally resulting in repeal, either officially or by interpretative pretence." J.
ELY, supra note 52, at 88 (emphasis supplied).
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trivialize the Fifth Article; and so forth. Until, of course, they find they
want to say something that none of their authorized fetishes will allow
them to say-in which case they invoke the awful oxymoron of substan-
tive due process to signify their collective perplexity.
It is only the structural reinterpretation of the 1930's, I believe, that
will allow us to transcend this familiar conflict between nihilism and fe-
tishism in the interpretation of our Constitution. For once we explicitly
recognize that laissez-faire capitalism was legitimately repudiated by a
process of structural amendment culminating in the 1930's, we are no
longer obliged to save the welfare state at the cost of trivializing the pro-
cess of legal interpretation. Instead, we can explain why it is right for
modern lawyers to reject the particular conceptions of freedom of contract,
private property, and states' rights dominant in the aftermath of the
American Revolution and Civil War. We refuse to elaborate these themes
for the same reason we refuse to listen to the Philadelphia Convention's
opinions on race relations. On these matters, preexisting principles have
been repealed, or at least profoundly revised, by successful constitutional
solutions enacted into higher law by later generations of Americans.
Having cleared away the historical rubble with the theory of structural
amendment, constitutionalists may then proceed, in the manner of these
Lectures, to develop the founding principles that do remain vital parts of
our higher law-exploring the complex ways in which even these themes
have been transformed by the new constitutional principles proclaimed in
the name of the People during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Rather than retreating to nihilism or fetishism, the dualist seeks to ad-
vance toward a holistic interpretation of our Constitution. We must or-
ganize into a coherent whole all the higher-law principles enacted by the
People in the course of two centuries of constitutional politics-most nota-
bly those advanced in response to the very different constitutional crises
engendered by the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the Great
Depression. From this holistic point of view, the master interpretive ques-
tions we confront today are these: How can we make sense of the Federal-
ist Constitution's affirmation of individual rights, given the Civil War
generation's guarantee of equality and the New Deal's legitimation of the
activist bureaucratic state? How may we give constitutional meaning to
each American's equal right to insist on personal freedom without embrac-
ing discredited notions of private property, free contract, and states'
rights?
To do these questions justice, we will require nothing less than a dual-
istic reinterpretation of every significant event in our constitutional his-
tory-from the American Revolution to Watergate, from Marbury to Roe.
Rather than rushing headlong into this project, these Lectures have tried
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to convince you of its necessity-by undermining the levelling premises
that bar the way to its active pursuit. I will count it a success if you
successfully resist the temptation to condemn the Supreme Court as a "de-
viant" or "countermajoritarian" force in the American constitutional sys-
tem. Rather than serving as a ritualistic bow to the god of judicial re-
straint, this levelling credo prevents us from attempting the pressing work
of dualist reinterpretation that is the proper mission of constitutional law.
Of course, not even a generation's efforts at dualist interpretation will
reveal that the American People have, over the course of two short centu-
ries, managed to establish an ideal society for themselves and their poster-
ity. Indeed, so far as I am concerned, our generation should count itself a
failure if it does not move beyond interpretation to make its own positive
contribution to the constitution of a society that is both freer and fairer
than the one we have inherited.
And yet, as a dualist reading of our past will only emphasize, such
contributions to a better America will not come cheaply. None of us can
expect our personal utopias to be greeted with loud hosannahs and uni-
versal approval. If the past is any guide, nothing much of permanent
value will be achieved without a great deal of passion, debate, and con-
flict. Indeed, as I review the first two centuries of our history, only one
thing is clear: While established constitutional law did not always resolve
America's deepest crises, it has always provided us with the language and
process within which our political identities could be confronted, debated,
and defined-both during the long periods of normal politics, like the one
we presently endure, and on those occasions when Americans found them-
selves called, once again, to undertake a serious effort to redefine and reaf-
firm their sense of national purpose.
I cannot believe, moreover, that constitutional lawyers will do anybody
any good if they finally succeed, after a great deal of effort, in levelling the
collective understanding of the distinctively dualistic discourse built up by
preceding generations of Americans. Instead, all they will have done is
destroy a democratic political tradition that-for all its historical contin-
gency and manifest imperfection-may fairly be claimed as one of the few
profound American contributions to the fund of Western thought.
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